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Financial Intermediation Chains
in an OTC Market
Abstract
This paper analyzes financial intermediation chains in a search model with an endogenous inter-
mediary sector. We show that the chain length and price dispersion among inter-dealer trades are
decreasing in search cost, search speed, and market size, but increasing in investors’ trading needs.
Using data from the U.S. corporate bond market, we find evidence broadly consistent with these
predictions. Moreover, as search speed approaches infinity, the search equilibrium does not always
converge to the centralized-market equilibrium: prices and allocation converge, but the trading
volume may not. Finally, the multiplicity and stability of the equilibrium is analyzed.
JEL Classification Numbers: G10.
Keywords: Search, Chain, Financial Intermediation, Multiplicity, Stability.
1 Introduction
Financial intermediation chains appear to be getting longer over time, that is, more and more layers
of intermediaries are involved in financial transactions. For instance, with the rise of securitization
in the U.S., the process of channeling funds from savers to investors is getting increasingly complex
(Adrian and Shin (2010)). This multi-layer nature of intermediation also appears in many other
markets. For example, the average daily trading volume in the Federal Funds market is more
than ten times the aggregate Federal Reserve balances (Taylor (2001)). The trading volume in the
foreign exchange market appears disproportionately large relative to international trade.1
These examples suggest the prevalence of intermediation chains. What determines the chain
length? How does it respond to the changes in economic environment? What are the implications
on asset prices, trading volume, and investor welfare? Our paper attempts to address these issues.
The full answer to the above questions is likely to be complex and hinges on a variety of
issues (e.g., transaction cost, trading technology, regulatory and legal environment, firm boundary).
However, we abstract away from many of these aspects to analyze a simple model of an over-the-
counter (OTC) market, and assess its predictions empirically.2
We extend the model in Hugonnier, Lester, and Weill (2016) by introducing search cost. In
the model, investors have heterogeneous valuations of an asset. Their valuations change over time,
leading to trading needs. When an investor enters the market to trade, he faces a delay in locating
his trading partner. In the mean time, he needs to pay a search cost each period until he finishes
his transaction. Hence, due to the search cost, not all investors choose to stay in the market
continuously, giving rise to a role of intermediation. Some investors choose to be intermediaries.
That is, they stay in the market continuously and act as dealers. Once they acquire the asset, they
immediately start searching to sell it to someone who values it more. Similarly, once they sell the
asset, they immediately start searching to buy it from someone who values it less. In contrast,
other investors act as customers: once their trades are executed, they leave the market to avoid
1According to the Main Economic Indicators database, the annual international trade in goods and services is
around $4 trillion in 2013. In that same year, however, the Bank of International Settlement estimates that the daily
trading volume in the foreign exchange market is around $5 trillion.
2OTC markets are enormous. According to the estimate by the Bank for International Settlements, the total
outstanding OTC derivatives is around 711 trillion dollars in December 2013.
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the search cost. We solve the model in closed-form, and the main implications are the following.
First, when the search cost is lower than a certain threshold, there is a unique intermediation
equilibrium. Investors with intermediate valuations of the asset choose to become dealers and stay
in the market continuously, while others (who have high or low valuations) choose to be customers,
and leave the market once their transactions are executed. Intuitively, if an investor has a high
valuation of an asset, once he obtains the asset, there is little benefit for him to stay in the market
since it is not very likely for him to find someone with an even higher valuation to sell the asset
to. Similarly, if an investor has a low valuation of the asset, once he sells the asset, there is little
benefit for him to stay in the market.
Second, the model has multiple non-degenerate equilibria.3 When the search cost is lower
than the previously-mentioned threshold, for example, in addition to the above intermediation
equilibrium, there also exists a non-intermediation equilibrium. This multiplicity comes from the
complementarity of search. When investors expect a large number of them to be actively searching
in the market, this makes it appealing for them to enter the market. The ensuing equilibrium
has a large number of active investors, lots of trading, and some of the investors choose to be
intermediaries. In the other equilibrium, investors expect a small number of them to be active,
making it unappealing to enter the market in the first place. Hence, the ensuing equilibrium
has a small number of active investors, low trading volume, and no intermediation arises in this
equilibrium. Moreover, the intermediation equilibrium is “stable” in the sense that it can “recover”
from small perturbations. The non-intermediation equilibrium is, however, not stable when the
search speed is sufficiently fast.
Third, at each point in time, there is a continuum of prices for the asset. When a buyer meets
a seller, their negotiated price depends on their specific valuations. The delay in execution in
the market makes it possible to have multiple prices for the asset. Naturally, as the search speed
improves, the price dispersion reduces, and converges to zero when the search speed goes to infinity.
Fourth, we characterize two equilibrium quantities on the intermediary sector, which can be
easily measured empirically. The first is the dispersion ratio, the price dispersion among inter-
3As is well known, there is always a degenerate equilibrium where no investor searches.
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dealer trades divided by the price dispersion among all trades in the economy.4 The second is the
length of the intermediation chain, the average number of layers of intermediaries for all customers’
transactions. Intuitively, both variables reflect the size of the intermediary sector. When more
investors choose to become dealers, the price dispersion among inter-dealer trades is larger (i.e.,
the dispersion ratio is higher), and customers’ transactions tend to go through more layers of dealers
(i.e., the chain is longer).
Our model implies that both the dispersion ratio and the chain length are decreasing in the
search cost, the speed of search, and the market size, but are increasing in investors’ trading
frequency. Intuitively, a higher search cost means that fewer investors find it profitable to be dealers,
leading to a smaller intermediary sector and hence a smaller dispersion ratio and chain length.
Similarly, with a higher search speed or a larger market size, intermediation is less profitable because
customers can find alternative trading partners more quickly. This leads to a smaller intermediary
sector (relative to the market size). Finally, when investors need to trade more frequently, the
higher profitability attracts more dealers and so increases the size of the intermediary sector.
We test these predictions using data from the U.S. corporate-bond market. The Trade Re-
porting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) records transaction prices, and identifies traders with
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) membership as “dealers,” and others as
“customers.” This allows us to construct the dispersion ratio and chain length.
We run Fama-MacBeth regressions of the dispersion ratio and chain length of a corporate bond
on proxies for search cost, market size, the frequency of investors’ trading needs. Our evidence
is broadly consistent with the model predictions. It is worth noting the difference between the
dependent variables in the two regressions: The dispersion ratio is constructed based on price data
while the chain length is based on quantity data. Yet, for almost all our proxies, their coefficient
estimates have the same sign across the two regressions, as implied by our model. For example,
relative to other bonds, investment-grade bonds’ price dispersion ratio is on average larger by 0.007
(t = 2.62), and their chain length is longer by 0.245 (t = 32.17). If one takes the interpretation
that it is less costly to make market for investment-grade bonds (i.e., the search cost is lower), then
4For convenience, we use “intermediary” and “dealer” interchangeably, and refer to the transactions among dealers
as “inter-dealer trades.”
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this evidence is consistent with our model prediction that the dispersion ratio and chain length
are decreasing in search cost. We also include in our regressions five other variables as proxies for
search cost, the frequency of investors’ trading needs, and market size. Among all 12 coefficients,
11 are highly significant and consistent with our model predictions.5
Fifth, when the search speed goes to infinity, the search-market equilibrium does not always
converge to a centralized-market equilibrium. Specifically, in the stable non-intermediation equilib-
rium (i.e., the search cost is higher than a certain threshold), as the search speed goes to infinity,
all equilibrium quantities (prices, volumes, and allocations) converge to their counterparts in the
centralized-market equilibrium. However, in the intermediation equilibrium (i.e., the search cost is
lower than the threshold), as the search speed goes to infinity, all the prices and asset allocations
converge but the trading volume in the search-market equilibrium remains higher than that in the
centralized-market equilibrium.
Intuitively, in the search market, intermediaries act as “middlemen” and generate “excess” trad-
ing. As noted earlier, when the search speed increases, the intermediary sector shrinks. However,
thanks to the faster search speed, each dealer executes more trades, and the total excess trading
volume is higher. As the search speed goes to infinity, the trading volume in the search market
remains significantly higher than that in a centralized market.
Sixth, the relation between dispersion ratio, chain length and investors’ welfare is ambiguous.
As noted earlier, a higher dispersion ratio and longer chain may be due to a lower search cost. In
this case, they imply higher investors welfare. On the other hand, they may be due to a slower
search speed. In that case, they imply lower investors welfare. Hence, the dispersion ratio and
chain length are not clear-cut welfare indicators.
Finally, we examine the efficiency of the intermediary sector in our model by comparing its size
with the size of the intermediary sector that would be chosen by a social planner. Our results are
reminiscent of the well-known Hosios (1990) condition that efficiency is achieved only for a specific
distribution of bargaining powers.
5The only exception is the coefficient for issuance size in the price dispersion ratio regression. As explained later,
we conjecture that this is due to dealers’ inventory capacity constraint, which is not considered in our model.
4
1.1 Related literature
Our paper belongs to the recent literature that analyzes OTC markets in the search framework
developed by Duffie, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2005). This framework has been extended to include
risk-averse agents (Duffie, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2007)), unrestricted asset holdings (Lagos and
Rocheteau (2009)). It has also been adopted to analyze a number of issues, such as security lending
(Duffie, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2002)), liquidity provision (Weill (2007)), on-the-run premium
(Vayanos and Wang (2007), Vayanos and Weill (2008)), cross-sectional returns (Weill (2008)),
portfolio choices (Garleanu (2009)), liquidity during a financial crisis (Lagos, Rocheteau, and Weill
(2011)), price pressure (Feldhutter (2012)), order flows in an OTC market (Lester, Rocheteau, and
Weill (2014)), commercial aircraft leasing (Gavazza 2011), high frequency trading (Pagnotta and
Philippon (2013)), the roles of benchmarks in OTC markets (Duffie, Dworczak, and Zhu (2014)),
adverse selection and repeated contacts in opaque OTC markets (Chang (2014), Zhu (2012)) the
effect of the supply of liquid assets (Shen and Yan (2014)) as well as the interaction between
corporate default decision and liquidity (He and Milbradt (2013)). Another literature follows
Kiyotaki and Wright (1993) to analyze the liquidity value of money. In particular, Lagos and
Wright (2005) develop a tractable framework that has been adopted to analyze liquidity and asset
pricing (e.g., Lagos (2010), Lester, Postlewaite, and Wright (2012), and Li, Rocheteau, and Weill
(2012), Lagos and Zhang (2014)). Trejos and Wright (2014) synthesize this literature with the
studies under the framework of Duffie, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2005).
Our paper is related to the literature on the trading network of financial markets, see, e.g.,
Gofman (2010), Babus and Kondor (2012), Malamud and Rostek (2012), Chang and Zhang (2015).
Viswanathan and Wang (2004) analyze inter-dealer trades. Atkeson, Eisfeldt, and Weill (2014)
analyze the risk-sharing and liquidity provision in an endogenous core-periphery network structure.
Neklyudov (2014) analyzes a search model with investors with heterogeneous search speeds to study
the implications on the network structure.
Intermediation has been analyzed in the search framework (e.g., Rubinstein and Wolinsky
(1987), and more recently Wright and Wong (2014), Nosal Wong and Wright (2015)). However,
the literature on financial intermediation chains has been recent. Adrian and Shin (2010) docu-
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ment that the financial intermediation chains are becoming longer in the U.S. during the past a
few decades. Li and Schurhoff (2012) document the network structure of the inter-dealer market
for municipal bonds. Di Maggio, Kermani, and Song (2015) analyze the trading relation during
a financial crisis. Glode and Opp (2014) focuses on the role of intermediation chain in reducing
adverse selection. Afonso and Lagos (2015) analyze an OTC market for federal funds.
Our model is an extension of the model in Hugonnier, Lester, and Weill (2016), which highlights
the rich dynamics in equilibrium with non-trivial heterogeneity. Our analysis generates new insight
along two dimensions. First, we introduce search cost into their model. Without search cost,
all investors stay in the market continuously. In our model, however, some investors choose to
be dealers and stay in the market continuously, while others choose to be customers and leave
the marker whenever their trades are executed. This feature allows more detailed analysis of
the endogenous intermediary sector, price dispersion ratio, and the intermediation chain We also
conduct empirical analysis of the intermediary sector. Second, in the original model in Hugonnier,
Lester, and Weill (2016), there is only one non-degenerate equilibrium. We show that the search cost
leads to multiple non-degenerate equilibria. We also show that, when the search cost approaches
zero, the stable equilibrium converges to the equilibrium in Hugonnier, Lester, and Weill (2016),
while the unstable equilibrium converges to the degenerate equilibrium with no trade.
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the model and its equilibrium. Section
3 analyzes the price dispersion and intermediation chain. Section 4 contrasts the search market
equilibrium with a centralized market equilibrium. Section 5 examines the multiplicity and stability
of the equilibrium. Section 6 tests the empirical predictions. Section 7 concludes. All proofs are in
the appendix.
2 Model
Our model is a generalization of the model in Hugonnier, Lester, and Weill (2016), by introducing
search cost. Specifically, time is continuous and goes from 0 to∞. There is a continuum of investors,
and the measure of the total population is N . They have access to a riskless bank account with an
interest rate r. There is an asset, which has a total supply of X units with X < N . Each unit of
the asset pays $1 per unit of time until infinity. The asset is traded at an over-the-counter market.
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Following Duffie, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2005), we assume the matching technology as the
following. Let Nb and Ns be the measures of buyers and sellers in the market, both of which will
be determined in equilibrium. A buyer meets a seller at the rate λNs, where λ > 0 is a constant.
That is, during [t, t+dt) a buyer meets a seller with a probability λNsdt. Similarly, a seller meets a
buyer at the rate λNb. Hence, the probability for an investor to meet his partner is proportional to
the population size of the investors on the other side of the market. The total number of matched
pairs per unit of time is λNsNb. The search friction reduces when λ increases, and disappears when
λ goes to infinity.
Investors have different types, and their types may change over time. If an investor’s current
type is ∆, he derives a utility 1+∆ when receiving the $1 coupon from the asset. One interpretation
for a positive ∆ is that some investors, such as insurance companies, have a preference for long-term
bonds, as modeled in Vayanos and Vila (2009). Another interpretation is that some investors can
benefit from using those assets as collateral and so value them more, as discussed in Bansal and
Coleman (1996) and Gorton (2010). A negative ∆ can be that the investor suffers a liquidity shock
and so finds it costly to carry the asset on his balance sheet. We assume that ∆ can take any value
in a closed interval. Without loss of generality, we normalize the interval to
[
0,∆
]
.
Each investor’s type changes independently with intensity κ. That is, during [t, t+ dt), with
a probability κdt, an investor’s type changes and is independently drawn from a random variable,
which has a probability density function f (·) on the support [0,∆], with f (∆) < ∞ for any
∆ ∈ [0,∆]. We use F (·) to denote the corresponding cumulative distribution function.
Following Duffie, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2005), we assume each investor can hold either 0 or
1 unit of the asset. That is, an investor can buy 1 unit of the asset only if he currently does not
have the asset, and can sell the asset only if he currently has it.
2.1 Investors’ choices
All investors are risk-neutral and share the same time discount rate r. They face a search cost of
c per unit of time, with c ≥ 0. That is, when an investor searches to buy or sell in the market, he
incurs a cost of cdt during [t, t+ dt). An investor’s objective function is given by
sup
θτ
Et
[∫ ∞
t
e−r(τ−t) [θτ (1 + ∆τ )− 1τ c] dτ −
∫ ∞
t
e−r(τ−t)Pτdθτ
]
,
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where θτ ∈ {0, 1} is the investor’s holding in the asset at time τ ; ∆τ is the investor’s type at time
τ ; 1τ is an indicator variable, which is 1 if the investor is searching in the market to buy or sell the
asset at time τ , and 0 otherwise; and Pτ is the asset’s price that the investor faces at time τ and
will be determined in equilibrium.
We will focus on the steady-state equilibrium. Hence, the value function of a type-∆ investor
with an asset holding θt at time t can be denoted as V (θt,∆). That is, the distribution of investors’
types is not a state variable, since it stays constant over time in the steady state equilibrium.
A non-owner (whose θt is 0) has two choices: search to buy the asset or stay inactive. We
use Vn(∆) to denote the investor’s expected utility if he chooses to stay inactive, and follows the
optimal strategy after his type changes. Similarly, we use Vb(∆) to denote the investor’s expected
utility if he searches to buy the asset, and follows the optimal strategy after he obtains the asset
or his type changes. Hence, by definition, we have
V (0,∆) = max(Vn(∆), Vb(∆)). (1)
An asset owner (whose θt is 1) has two choices: search to sell the asset or stay inactive. We use
Vh(∆) to denote the investor’s expected utility if he chooses to be an inactive holder, and follows the
optimal strategy after his type changes. Similarly, we use Vs(∆) to denote the investor’s expected
utility if he searches to sell, and follows the optimal strategy after he sells his asset or his type
changes. Hence, we have
V (1,∆) = max(Vh(∆), Vs(∆)). (2)
We conjecture, and will verify later, that in equilibrium, equation (1) implies that a non-owner’s
optimal choice is given by {
stay out of the market if ∆ ∈ [0,∆b),
search to buy the asset if ∆ ∈ (∆b,∆], (3)
where the cutoff point ∆b will be determined in equilibrium. A type-∆b non-owner is indifferent
between staying out of the market and searching to buy the asset. Note that due to the search
friction, a buyer faces delay in his transaction. In the meantime, his type may change, and he will
adjust his action accordingly. Similarly, we conjecture that equation (2) implies that an owner’s
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optimal choice is {
search to sell his asset if ∆ ∈ [0,∆s),
stay out of the market if ∆ ∈ (∆s,∆], (4)
where the ∆s will be determined in equilibrium. A type-∆s owner of the asset is indifferent
between the two actions. A seller faces potential delay in his transaction. In the meantime, if his
type changes, he will adjust his action accordingly. If an investor succeeds in selling his asset, he
becomes a non-owner and his choices are then described by equation (3).
Suppose a buyer of type x meets a seller of type y. The surplus from the transaction is
S (x, y) = [V (1, x) + V (0, y)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
total utility after trade
− [V (0, x) + V (1, y)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
total utility before trade
. (5)
Of course, the transaction takes place if and only if the surplus is positive. We assume that the
buyer has a bargaining power η ∈ (0, 1), i.e., the buyer gets η of the surplus from the transaction,
and hence the price is given by
P (x, y) = V (1, x)− V (0, x)− ηS(x, y), if and only if S(x, y) > 0. (6)
Note that V (1, x)−V (0, x) is the buyer’s reservation value, i.e., his utility increase from obtaining
the asset. Hence, if the buyer can obtain the asset at P (x, y), he improves his utility by ηS(x, y).
We conjecture, and verify later, that when a buyer and a seller meet in the market, the surplus
is positive if and only if the buyer’s type is higher than the seller’s:
S (x, y) > 0 if and only if x > y. (7)
That is, a transaction occurs if and only if the buyer’s type is higher than the seller’s type. With
this conjecture, we obtain investors’ optimality condition in the steady state as the following.
Vh (∆) =
1 + ∆ + κE [max {Vh (∆′) , Vs (∆′)}]
κ+ r
, (8)
Vs (∆) =
1 + y − c
κ+ r
+
λ (1− η)
κ+ r
∫ ∆
∆
S (x,∆)µb (x) dx+
κE [max {Vh(∆′),Vs(∆′)}]
κ+ r
, (9)
Vn (∆) =
κE [max {Vn (∆′) , Vb (∆′)}]
κ+ r
, (10)
Vb (∆) = − c
κ+ r
+
λη
κ+ r
∫ ∆
0
S (∆, x)µs (x) dx+
κE [max {Vb (∆) , Vn}]
κ+ r
, (11)
where ∆′ is a random variable with a PDF of f(·).
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2.2 Intermediation
Decision rules (3) and (4) determine whether intermediation arises in equilibrium. There are two
cases. In the first case, ∆b ≥ ∆s, there is no intermediation. When an investor has a trading need,
he enters the market. Once his transaction is executed, he leaves the market and stays inactive.
In the other case ∆b < ∆s, however, some investors choose to be intermediaries and stay in the
market continuously. If they are non-owners, they search to buy the asset. Once they receive the
asset, however, they immediately search to sell the asset. For convenience, we call them “dealers.”
Details are illustrated in Figure 1. Panel A is for the case without intermediation, i.e., ∆b ≥ ∆s.
If an asset owner’s type is below ∆s, as in the upper-left box, he enters the market to sell his asset.
If successful, he becomes a non-owner and chooses to be inactive since his type is below ∆b, as in
the upper-right box. Similarly, if a non-owner’s type is higher than ∆b, as in the lower-right box, he
enters the market to buy the asset. If successful, he becomes an owner and chooses to be inactive
because his type is above ∆s, as in the lower-left box.
The dashed arrows illustrate investors’ chooses to enter or exit the market when their types
change. Suppose, for example, an owner with a type below ∆s is searching in the market to sell his
asset, as in the upper-left box. Before he meets a buyer, however, if his type changes and becomes
higher than ∆s, he will exit the market and become an inactive owner in the lower-left box. Finally,
note that all investors in the interval (∆s,∆b) are inactive regardless of their asset holdings.
Panel B illustrates the case with intermediation, i.e., ∆b < ∆s. As in Panel A, asset owners with
types below ∆s enter the market to sell their assets. However, they have two different motives.
If a seller’s type is in [0,∆b), as in the upper-left box, after selling the asset, he will leave the
market and become an inactive non-owner in the upper-right box. For convenience, we call this
investor a “true seller.” This is to contrast with those sellers whose types are in (∆b,∆s), as in
the middle-left box. We call them “intermediation sellers,” because once they sell their assets and
become non-owners (i.e., move to the middle-right box), they immediately search to buy the asset
in the market since their types are higher than ∆b. Similarly, we call non-owners with types in
(∆s,∆] “true buyers” and those with types in (∆b,∆s) “intermediation buyers.”
In the intermediation region (∆b,∆s), investors always stay in the market. If they are asset
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owners, they search to sell their assets. Once they become non-owners, however, they immediately
start searching to buy the asset. They buy the asset from those with low types and sell it to those
with high types, and make profits from their intermediation services.
What determines whether intermediation arises in equilibrium? Intuitively, a key determinant
is the search cost c. Investors are only willing to become intermediaries when the expected trading
profit is enough to cover the search cost. We will see later that the intermediation equilibrium
arises if c < c∗, and a non-intermediation equilibrium arises if c ≥ c∗, where c∗ is given by equation
(84) in the appendix.
Our formulation captures two important features of the intermediation sector. First, while
customers leave the market once they finish their trades, intermediaries stay in the market contin-
uously. Second, relative to intermediaries, customers tend to have more extreme valuations of the
asset. For tractability, however, we also adopt some simplifications. For instance, all investors are
assumed to be ex ante identical. One consequence is that the intermediaries in our model have a
chance to become customers after shocks to their types. However, this is not as unrealistic as it
appears: Of course, in reality, the identities of “dealers” and “customers” are persistent. However,
identities do switch when, for example, new dealers enter, or existing dealers exit the market. For
instance, Lehman Brothers was a major dealer for corporate bonds before it filed for bankruptcy
in 2008. After this shock, Lehman Brothers is more like a customer in this market, trying to sell
its holdings. More generally, however, traders’ identities are perhaps more persistent than implied
by our formulation. In practice, some institutions specialize and act as dealers for an extended
period of time. This feature can be captured in our framework by introducing a switching cost. It
is natural to expect that, with this cost, investors will not switch their identities between dealers
and customers, unless they experience very large shocks to their types. However, this extension
makes the model much less tractable and we leave it to future research.
2.3 Demographics
We will first focus on the intermediation equilibrium case, and leave the analysis of the non-
intermediation case to Section 5. Due to the changes in ∆ and his transactions in the market, an
investor’s status (i.e., his type ∆ and asset holding θ) changes over time. We now describe the
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evolution of the population sizes of each group of investors. Since we will focus on the steady-state
equilibrium, we will omit the time subscript for simplicity.
We use µb(∆) to denote the density of buyers, that is, buyers’ population size in the region
(∆,∆ + d∆) is µb(∆)d∆. Similarly, we use µn(∆), µs(∆), and µh(∆) to denote the density of
inactive non-owners, sellers, and inactive asset holders, respectively. The following accounting
identity holds for any ∆ ∈ [0,∆]:
µs (∆) + µb (∆) + µn (∆) + µh (∆) = Nf (∆) . (12)
Decision rules (3) and (4) imply that for any ∆ ∈ (∆s,∆],
µn (∆) = µs (∆) = 0. (13)
The group size of inactive holders remains a constant over time, implying that for any ∆ ∈ (∆s,∆],
κµh (∆) = κXf (∆) + λNsµb (∆) . (14)
The left hand aside of the above equation is the “outflow” from the group of inactive holders: The
measure of inactive asset holders in interval (∆,∆ +d∆) is µh (∆) d∆. During [t, t+ dt), a fraction
κdt of them experience changes in their types and leave the group. Hence, the total outflow is
κµh (∆) d∆dt. The right hand side of the above equation is the “inflow” to the group: A fraction
κdt of asset owners, who have a measure of X, experience type shocks and κXf (∆) d∆dt investors’
new types fall in the interval (∆,∆ + d∆). This is captured by the first term in the right hand side
of (14). The second term reflects the inflow of investors due to transactions. When buyers with
types in (∆,∆ + d∆) acquire the asset, they become inactive asset holders, and the size of this
group is λNsµb (∆) d∆dt. Similarly, for any ∆ ∈ [0,∆b), we have
µb (∆) = µh (∆) = 0, (15)
κµn (∆) = κ (N −X) f (∆) + λNbµs (∆) . (16)
For any ∆ ∈ (∆b,∆s), we have
µn (∆) = µh (∆) = 0, (17)
κµs (∆) = κXf (∆)− λµs (∆)
∫ ∆
∆
µb (x) dx+ λµb (∆)
∫ ∆
0
µs (x) dx. (18)
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2.4 Equilibrium
Definition 1 The steady-state intermediation equilibrium consists of two cutoff points ∆b and ∆s,
with 0 < ∆b < ∆s < ∆, the distributions of investor groups (µb (∆), µs (∆), µn (∆), µh (∆)), and
asset prices P (x, y), such that
• the asset prices P (x, y) are determined by (6),
• choices (3) and (4) are optimal for all investors,
• (µb (∆), µs (∆), µn (∆), µh (∆)) are time invariant, i.e., satisfy (12)–(18),
• market clears: ∫ ∆
0
[µs(∆) + µh(∆)] d∆ = X. (19)
Theorem 1 If c < c∗, where c∗ is given by equation (84), there exists a unique steady-state equi-
librium with ∆b < ∆s. The value of ∆b is given by the unique solution to
c =
λκηX
[κ+ r + λNb (1− η)] (κ+ λNb)
∫ ∆b
0
F (x) dx, (20)
the value of ∆s is given by the unique solution to
c =
λκ (1− η) (N −X)
(κ+ r + ληNs) (κ+ λNs)
∫ ∆
∆s
[1− F (x)] dx, (21)
where Ns and Nb are given by (64) and (66).
Investor distributions (µb (∆), µs (∆), µn (∆), µh (∆)) are given by equations (56)–(63).
When a type-x buyer (x ∈ (∆b,∆]) and a type-y seller (y ∈ [0,∆s)) meet in the market, they
will agree to trade if and only if x > y, and their negotiated price is given by (6), with the value
function V (·, ·) given by (79)–(82).
This theorem shows that when the cost of search is smaller than c∗, there is a unique inter-
mediation equilibrium. Investors whose types are in the interval (∆b,∆s) choose to be dealers.
They search to buy the asset if they do not own it. Once they obtain the asset, however, they
immediately start searching to sell it. They make profits from the differences in purchase and sale
prices to compensate the search cost they incur. In contrast, sellers with a type ∆ ∈ [0,∆s) and
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buyers with a type ∆ ∈ (∆b,∆] are true buyers and true sellers, and they leave the market once
they finish their transactions.
Investor distributions (µb (∆) , µs (∆) , µn (∆) , µh (∆)) determine the speed with which investors
meet their trading partners, which in turn determines investors’ type distributions. The equilibrium
is the solution to this fixed-point problem. The above theorem shows that the distributions can be
computed in closed-form, making the analysis of the equilibrium tractable.
To illustrate the equilibrium, we define R(∆), for ∆ ∈ [0,∆], as
R(∆) ≡ µs (∆) + µh (∆)
µb (∆) + µn (∆)
.
That is, R(∆) is the density ratio of asset owners (i.e., sellers and inactive holders) to nonowners
(i.e., buyers and inactive nonowners). It has the following property.
Proposition 1 In the equilibrium in Theorem 1, R(∆) is weakly increasing in ∆: R′(∆) > 0 for
∆ ∈ (∆b,∆s), and R′(∆) = 0 for ∆ ∈ [0,∆b) ∪ (∆s,∆].
The above proposition shows that high-∆ investors are more likely to be owners of the asset in
equilibrium. The intuition is the following. As noted in (7), when a buyer meets a seller, transaction
happens if and only if the buyer’s type is higher than the seller’s. Hence, if a nonowner has a higher
∆ he is more likely to find a willing seller. On the other hand, if an owner has a higher ∆ he is
less likely to find a willing buyer. Consequently, in equilibrium, the higher the investor’s type, the
more likely he is an owner.
Proposition 2 In the equilibrium in Theorem 1, we have ∂P (x,y)∂x > 0 and
∂P (x,y)
∂y > 0.
The price of each transaction is negotiated between the buyer and the seller, and depends on the
types of both. Since there is a continuum of buyers and sellers, there is a continuum of equilibrium
prices at each point in time. The above proposition shows that the negotiated price is increasing in
both the buyer’s and the seller’s types. Intuitively, the higher the buyer’s type, the more he values
the asset. Hence, he is willing to pay a higher price. On the other hand, the higher the seller’s
type, the less eager he is in selling the asset. Hence, only a higher price can induce him to sell.
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3 Intermediation Chain and Price Dispersion
If a true buyer and a true seller meet in the market, the asset is transferred without going through
an intermediary. On other occasions, however, transactions may go through multiple dealers. For
example, a type-∆ dealer may buy from a true seller, whose type is in [0,∆b), or from another
dealer whose type is lower than ∆. Then, he may sell the asset to a true buyer, whose type is in
(∆s,∆], or to another dealer whose type is higher than ∆. That is, for an asset to be transferred
from a true seller to a true buyer, it may go through multiple dealers.
What is the average length of the intermediation chain in the economy? To analyze this, we
first compute the aggregate trading volumes for each group of investors. We use TVcc to denote the
total number of shares of the asset that are sold from a true seller to a true buyer (i.e., “customer
to customer”) per unit of time. Similarly, we use TVcd, TVdd, and TVdc to denote the numbers of
shares of the asset that are sold, per unit of time, from a true seller to a dealer (i.e., “customer to
dealer”), from a dealer to another (i.e., “dealer to dealer”), and from a dealer to a true buyer (i.e.,
“dealer to customer”), respectively. To characterize these trading volumes, we denote Fb(∆) and
Fs(∆), for ∆ ∈ [0,∆], as
Fb(∆) ≡
∫ ∆
0
µb(x)dx,
Fs(∆) ≡
∫ ∆
0
µs(x)dx.
That is, Fb(∆) is the population size of buyers whose types are below ∆, and Fs(∆) is population
size of sellers whose types are below ∆.
Proposition 3 In the equilibrium in Theorem 1, we have
TVcc = λFs(∆b) [Nb − Fb(∆s)] , (22)
TVcd = λFs(∆b)Fb(∆s), (23)
TVdc = λ [Ns − Fs(∆b)] [Nb − Fb(∆s)] , (24)
TVdd = λ
∫ ∆s
∆b
[Fs(∆)− Fs(∆b)] dFb(∆). (25)
The above proposition characterizes the four types of trading volumes. For example, true sellers
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are those whose types are below ∆b. The total measure of those investors is Fs(∆b). True buyers
are those whose types are above ∆s, and so the total measure of those investors is Nb − Fb(∆s).
This leads to the trading volume in (22). The results on TVcd and TVdc are similar. Note that
in these 3 types of trades, every meeting results in a transaction, since the buyer’s type is always
higher than the seller’s. For the meetings among dealers, however, this is not the case. When a
dealer buyer meets a dealer seller with a higher ∆, they will not be able to reach an agreement
to trade. The expression of TVdd in (25) takes into account the fact that transaction occurs only
when the buyer’s type is higher than the seller’s.
With these notations, we can define the length of the intermediation chain as
L ≡ TVcd + TVdc + 2TVdd
TVcd + TVdc + 2TVcc
. (26)
This definition implies that L is the average number of layers of dealers in the economy. To see this,
let us go through the following three simple examples.6 First, suppose there is no intermediation in
the economy and true buyers and true sellers trade directly. In this case, we have TVcd = TVdc =
TVdd = 0. Hence L = 0, that is, the length of the intermediation chain is 0. Second, suppose a
dealer buys one unit of the asset from a customer and sells it to another customer. We then have
TVcd = TVdc = 1 and TVdd = TVcc = 0. Hence, the length of the intermediation chain is 1. Third,
suppose a dealer buys one unit of the asset from a customer and sells it to another dealer, who
then sells it to a customer. We then have TVcd = TVdc = 1, TVdd = 1, and TVcc = 0. Hence,
the chain length is 2. In the following, we will analyze the effects of search speed λ, search cost c,
market size X, and trading need κ on the intermediation chain.
3.1 Search cost c
Proposition 4 In the equilibrium in Theorem 1, ∂∆b∂c > 0 and
∂∆s
∂c < 0, that is, the total population
size of the intermediary sector is decreasing in c.
Intuitively, investors balance the gain from trade against the search cost. The search cost has
a disproportionately large effect on dealers since they stay in the market constantly. Hence, when
6The validity of the measure in (26) does not depend on the assumption that investors can only hold 0 or 1 unit
of the asset.
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the search cost increases, fewer investors choose to be dealers and so the size of the intermediary
sector becomes smaller, i.e., the interval (∆b,∆s) shrinks. Consequently, the smaller intermediary
sector leads to a shorter intermediation chain, as summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 In the equilibrium in Theorem 1, ∂L∂c < 0, that is, the length of the financial
intermediation chain is decreasing in c.
When c increases to c∗, the interval (∆b,∆s) shrinks to a single point and the intermediary sector
disappears. Hence, we have limc→c∗ L = 0. On the other hand, as c decreases, more investors choose
to be dealers, leading to more layers of intermediation and a longer chain in the economy. What
happens when c goes to zero?
Proposition 6 In the equilibrium in Theorem 1, when c goes to 0, we obtain:
∆b = 0, ∆s = ∆,
Ns = X, Nb = N −X,
L =∞.
As the search cost c diminishes, the intermediary sector (∆b,∆s) expands. When c goes to 0,
(∆b,∆s) becomes the whole interval (0,∆). That is, almost all investors (except zero measure of
them at 0 and ∆) are intermediaries, constantly searching in the market. Hence, Ns = X and
Nb = N − X, that is, virtually every asset holder is trying to sell his asset and every non-owner
is trying to buy. Since virtually all transactions are intermediation trading, the length of the
intermediation chain is infinity.
This proposition demonstrates that, as the search cost c approaches 0, the intermediation
equilibrium in our model converges to the equilibrium in Hugonnier, Lester, and Weill (2016),
where the search cost c is 0. Interestingly, in Section 5, we show that there also exists another
equilibrium, which does not converge to the equilibrium in Hugonnier, Lester, and Weill (2016),
when c goes to zero.
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3.2 Search speed λ
Proposition 7 In the equilibrium in Theorem 1, when λ is sufficiently large, ∂∆s−∆b∂λ < 0, that is,
the size of the intermediary sector is decreasing in λ; ∂L∂λ < 0, that is, the length of the financial
intermediation chain is decreasing in λ.
The intuition for the above result is as follows. As the search technology improves, a customer
has a better outside option when he trades with a dealer, since the customer can find an alternative
trading partner more quickly if the dealer were to turn down the trade. As a result, intermediation
is less profitable and the dealer sector shrinks, leading to a shorter intermediation chain.
3.3 Market size X
To analyze the effect of the market size X, we keep the ratio of investor population N and asset
supply X constant. That is, we let
N = φX, (27)
where φ is a constant. Hence, when the issuance size X changes, the population size N also changes
proportionally. We impose this condition to shut down the effect from the change in the ratio of
asset owners and non-owners in equilibrium.
Proposition 8 In the equilibrium in Theorem 1, under condition (27), when λ is sufficiently large,
∂∆s−∆b
∂X < 0, that is, the intermediary sector shrinks when the market size increases;
∂L
∂X < 0, that
is, the length of the financial intermediation chain is decreasing in the market size X.
Intuitively, when the market size gets larger, it becomes easier for an investor to meet his
trading partner. Hence, the effect is similar to that from an increase in the search speed λ. From
the intuition in Proposition 7, we obtain that the length of the financial intermediation chain is
decreasing in the size of the market.
3.4 Trading need κ
Proposition 9 In the equilibrium in Theorem 1, when λ is sufficiently large, ∂(∆s−∆b)∂κ > 0, and
∂L
∂κ > 0, that is, the intermediary sector expands and the length of the intermediation chain increases
when the frequency of investors’ trading need increases.
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The intuition for the above result is as follows. Suppose κ increases, i.e., investors need to trade
more frequently. This makes it more profitable for dealers. Hence, the intermediary sector expands
as more investors choose to become dealers, leading to a longer intermediation chain.
3.5 Price dispersion
How is the price dispersion related to search frictions? It seems reasonable to expect the price
dispersion to decrease as the market frictions diminishes. However, this intuition is not complete,
and the relationship between price dispersion and search frictions is more subtle.
To see this, we use D to denote the price dispersion
D ≡ Pmax − Pmin, (28)
where Pmax and Pmin are the maximum and minimum prices, respectively, among all prices. Propo-
sition 2 implies that
Pmax = P (∆,∆s), (29)
Pmin = P (∆b, 0). (30)
That is, Pmax is the price for the transaction between a buyer of type ∆ and a seller of type ∆s.
Similarly, Pmin is the price of the transaction between a buyer of type ∆b and a seller of type 0.
The following proposition shows that effect of the search speed on the price dispersion.
Proposition 10 In the equilibrium in Theorem 1, when λ is sufficiently large, ∂D∂λ < 0.
The intuition is the following. When the search speed is faster, investors do not have to com-
promise as much on prices to speed up their transactions, because they can easily find alternative
trading partners if their current trading partners decided to walk away from their transactions.
Hence, the dispersion across prices becomes smaller when λ increases.
However, the relation between the price dispersion and the search cost c is more subtle. As the
search cost increases, fewer investors participate in the market. On the one hand, this makes it
harder to find a trading partner and so increases the price dispersion as the previous proposition
suggests. There is, however, an opposite driving force: Less diversity across investors leads to a
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smaller price dispersion. In particular, as noted in Proposition 4, ∆s is decreasing in c, that is,
when the search cost increases, only investors with lower types are willing to pay the cost to try to
sell their assets. This reduces the maximum price Pmax. On the other hand, when the search cost
increases, only investors with higher types are willing to buy. This increases the minimum price
Pmin. Therefore, as the search cost increases, the second force decreases the price dispersion. The
following proposition shows that the second force can dominate.
Proposition 11 In the equilibrium in Theorem 1, the sign of ∂D∂c can be either positive or negative.
Moreover, when c is sufficiently small, we have ∂D∂c < 0.
Price dispersion in OTC markets has been documented in the literature, e.g., Green, Hollifield,
and Schurhoff (2007). Jankowitsch, Nashikkar, and Subrahmanyam (2011) proposes that price
dispersion can be used as a measure of liquidity. Our analysis in Proposition 10 confirms this
intuition that the price dispersion is larger when the search speed is lower, which can be interpreted
as the market being less liquid. However, Proposition 11 also illustrates the potential limitation,
especially in an environment with a low search cost. It shows that the price dispersion may decrease
when the search cost is higher.
3.6 Price dispersion ratio
To further analyze the price dispersion in the economy, we define dispersion ratio as
DR ≡ P
d
max − P dmin
Pmax − Pmin , (31)
where P dmax and P
d
min are the maximum and minimum prices, respectively, among inter-dealer
transactions. That is, DR is the ratio of the price dispersion among inter-dealer transactions to
the price dispersion among all transactions.
This dispersion ratio measure has two appealing features. First, somewhat surprisingly, it turns
out to be easier to measure DR than D. Conceptually, price dispersion D is the price dispersion at
a point in time. When measuring it empirically, however, we have to compromise and measure the
price dispersion during a period of time (e.g., a month or a quarter), rather than at an instant. As
a result, the asset price volatility directly affects the measure D. In contrast, the dispersion ratio
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DR alleviates part of this problem since asset price volatility affects both the numerator and the
denominator. Second, as noted in Proposition 11, the effect of search cost on the price dispersion
is ambiguous. In contrast, our model predictions on the price dispersion ratio are sharper, as
illustrated in the following proposition.
Proposition 12 In the equilibrium in Theorem 1, we have ∂DR∂c < 0; when λ is sufficiently large,
we have ∂DR∂λ < 0,
∂DR
∂κ > 0, and under condition (27) we have
∂DR
∂X < 0.
Intuitively, DR is closely related to the size of the intermediary sector. All these parameters
(c, λ,X, and κ) affect DR through their effects on the interval (∆b,∆s). For example, as noted in
Proposition 4, when the search cost c increases, the intermediary sector (∆b,∆s) shrinks, and so
the price dispersion ratio DR decreases. The intuition for the effects of all other parameters (λ,X,
and κ) is similar.
In summary, both DR and L are closely related to the size of the intermediary sector. All
the parameters of (c, λ,X, and κ) affect both DR and L through their effects on the size of the
intermediary sector, i.e., the size of the interval (∆b,∆s). Indeed, by comparing the above results
with Propositions 5, 7, 8, and 9, we can see that, for all four parameters (c, λ,X, and κ), the effects
on DR and L have the same sign.
3.7 Welfare
What are the welfare implications from the intermediation chain? For example, is a longer interme-
diation chain an indication of higher or lower investors’ welfare? Propositions 5–12 have shed some
light on this question. In particular, a longer intermediation chain is a sign of a lower c, a lower λ,
a higher κ, or a lower X, which have different welfare implications. Hence, the chain length and
dispersion ratio are not clear-cut indicators of investors’ welfare.
For example, a lower c means that more investors search in equilibrium. Hence, high-∆ investors
can obtain the asset more quickly, leading to higher welfare for all investors. On the other hand,
a lower λ means that investors obtain their desired asset positions more slowly, leading to lower
welfare for investors. Therefore, if the intermediation chain L becomes longer because of a lower
c, it is a sign of higher investor welfare. However, if it is due to a slower search speed λ, it is
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a sign of lower investor welfare. A higher κ means that investors have more frequent trading
needs. If L becomes longer because of a higher κ, holding the market condition constant, this
implies that investors have lower welfare. Finally, if L becomes longer because of a smaller X, it
means that investors execute their trades more slowly, leading to lower welfare for investors. To
formalize the above intuition, we use W to denote the average expected utility across all investors
in the economy. The relation between investors’ welfare and those parameters is summarized in
the following proposition.
Proposition 13 In the equilibrium in Theorem 1, we have ∂W∂c < 0; when λ is sufficiently large,
we have ∂W∂λ > 0,
∂W
∂κ < 0, and under condition (27)
∂W
∂X > 0.
3.8 Efficiency
We now examine the efficiency of the intermediary sector size. Let’s imagine a social planner, who
can choose the two cutoff points in (3) and (4) to maximize the average of all investors’ expected
utility over their life time. Investors follow this decision rule set by the social planner, and face
the same market frictions as described in Section 2. Compared to this social planer equilibrium,
does the decentralized equilibrium in Theorem 1 have efficient amount of intermediaries? The
asymptotic analysis in the following proposition shows that this is generally not the case.
Proposition 14 Suppose λ is sufficiently large. If η = 1/2, the intermediary sector in the decen-
tralized equilibrium is close to that in the social planner case:
∆b = ∆
e
b + o(λ
−1/2), (32)
∆s = ∆
e
s + o(λ
−1/2). (33)
If η 6= 1/2, however, the decentralized equilibrium may have too much or too little intermediation.
The above results are reminiscent of the Hosios (1990) condition that efficiency is achieved only
for a specific distribution of bargaining powers between buyers and sellers. The matching function
we adopted is symmetric for buyers and sellers, and our proposition shows that the efficiency is
achieved when the buyers and sellers have the same bargaining power. In the case of η 6= 1/2,
however, the decentralized equilibrium is generally inefficient. We illustrate in the proof of this
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proposition that the decentralized equilibrium may have too much or too little intermediation,
depending on the distribution of investors’ types F (·).
4 On Convergence
When the search friction disappears, does the search market equilibrium converge to the equilibrium
in a centralized market? Since Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985) and Gale (1987), it is generally
believed that the answer is yes. This convergence result is also demonstrated in Duffie, Garleanu,
and Pedersen (2005), the framework we adopted.
However, we show in this section that as the search technology approaches perfection (i.e., λ goes
to infinity) the search equilibrium does not always converge to a centralized market equilibrium. In
particular, consistent with the existing literature, the prices and allocation in the search equilibrium
converge to their counterparts in a centralized-market equilibrium, but the trading volume may not.
4.1 Centralized market benchmark
Suppose we replace the search market in Section 2 by a centralized market and keep the rest of
the economy the same. That is, investors can execute their transactions without any delay. The
centralized market equilibrium consists of an asset price Pw and a cutoff point ∆w. All asset owners
above ∆w and nonowners below ∆w stay inactive. Moreover, each nonowner with a type higher
than ∆w buys one unit of the asset instantly and each owner with a type lower than ∆w sells his
asset instantly, such that all investors find their strategies optimal, the distribution of all groups
of investors remain constant over time, and the market clears. This equilibrium is given by the
following proposition.
Proposition 15 In this centralized market economy, the equilibrium is given by
∆w = F
−1
(
1− X
N
)
, (34)
Pw =
1 + ∆w
r
. (35)
The total trading volume per unit of time is
TVw = κX
(
1− X
N
)
. (36)
23
As shown in (35), the asset price is determined by the marginal investor’s valuation ∆w. Asset
allocation is efficient since (almost) all investors whose types are higher than ∆w are asset owners,
and (almost) all investors whose types are lower than ∆w are nonowners. Trading needs arise when
investors’ types change. In particular, an asset owner becomes a seller if his new type is below ∆w
and a nonowner becomes a buyer if his new type is above ∆w. In this idealized market, they can
execute their transactions instantly. Hence, at each point in time, the total measure of buyers and
sellers are infinitesimal, and the total trading volume during [t, t+ dt) is TVwdt.
4.2 The limit case of the search market
Denote the total trading volume in the search market economy in Section 2 as
TV ≡ TVcc + TVcd + TVdc + TVdd. (37)
The following proposition reports asymptotic properties of the search equilibrium.
Proposition 16 When λ goes to infinity, the equilibrium in Theorem 1 is given by
lim
λ→∞
∆b = lim
λ→∞
∆s = ∆w, (38)
lim
λ→∞
P (x, y) = Pw for any x < y, (39)
lim
λ→∞
µh(∆) =
{
Nf(∆) if ∆ > ∆w,
0 if ∆ < ∆w,
(40)
lim
λ→∞
µn(∆) =
{
0 if ∆ > ∆w,
Nf(∆) if ∆ < ∆w,
(41)
lim
λ→∞
µb(∆) = lim
λ→∞
µs(∆) = 0, (42)
lim
λ→∞
TV− TVw
TVw
= log
cˆ
c
, (43)
where cˆ is a constant, with cˆ > c, and is given by
cˆ =
√∫ ∆w
0
F (x)
F (∆w)
dx
√∫ ∆
∆w
1− F (x)
1− F (∆w)dx. (44)
As λ goes to infinity, many aspects of the search equilibrium converge to their counterparts in a
centralized market equilibrium. First, the interval (∆b,∆s) shrinks to a single point at ∆w (equation
(38)), and the size of the intermediary sector goes to zero. Second, all transaction prices converge
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to the price in the centralized market, as shown in equation (39). Third, the asset allocation in the
search equilibrium converges to that in the centralized market. As shown in equations (40)–(42),
almost all investors whose types are higher than ∆w are inactive asset holders, and almost all
investors whose types are lower than ∆w are inactive nonowners. The population sizes for buyers
and sellers are infinitesimal.
However, there is one important difference. The equation (43) shows that as λ goes to infinity,
the total trading volume in the search market equilibrium is higher than the volume in the central-
ized market equilibrium. This is surprising, especially given the result in (38) that the size of the
intermediary sector shrinks to 0.
It is worth emphasizing that this result is not a mathematical quirk from taking limit. Rather,
it highlights an important difference between a search market and an idealized centralized market.
Intuitively, the excess trading in the search market is due to intermediaries, who act as middlemen,
buying the asset from one investor and selling to another. As λ increases, the intermediary sector
shrinks. However, thanks to the faster search technology, each intermediary can execute more
trades such that the total excess trading induced by intermediaries increases with λ despite the
reduction of the intermediary sector size. As λ goes to infinity, the trading volume in the search
market remains significantly higher than that in a centralized market. As illustrated in (43), the
difference between TV and TVw is larger when the search cost c is smaller, and approaches infinity
when c goes to 0.
These results shed some light on why centralized market models have trouble explaining trading
volume, especially in markets with small search frictions. Even in the well-developed stock market
in the U.S., some trading features are perhaps better captured by a search model. Over the
past a few decades, the cheaper and faster technology makes it possible for investors to exploit
opportunities that were prohibitive with a less developed technology. Numerous trading platforms
were set up to compete with main exchanges; hedge funds and especially high-frequency traders
directly compete with traditional market makers. It seems likely that the increase in turnover in
the stock market in the past a few decades was driven partly by the decrease in the search frictions
in the market. Intermediaries, such as high frequency traders, execute a large volume of trades to
exploit opportunities that used to be prohibitive.
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5 Alternative Equilibrium
Our analysis so far has focused on the intermediation equilibrium (i.e., the equilibrium with ∆b <
∆s). Theorem 1 shows that there is a unique intermediation equilibrium for the case of c < c
∗.
We can also verify from the proof of Theorem 1 that intermediation equilibrium does not exist
for the case of c ≥ c∗. This section, however, shows that non-intermediation equilibrium (i.e., the
equilibrium with ∆b ≥ ∆s) exists, for both the case of c < c∗ and the case c ≥ c∗.
5.1 Non-intermediation equilibrium
The construction of the non-intermediation equilibrium is similar to that in Section 2. Specifically,
investors’ decision rules are given by (3) and (4). The optimality condition implies (8)–(11). What
is new is ∆b ≥ ∆s, which implies that a buyer’s type is always higher than a seller’s type, and
so every meeting between a buyer and a seller results in a trade. The demographic evolution is
illustrated in Panel A of Figure 1. Investors with intermediate valuations (i.e., ∆ ∈ (∆s,∆b)) choose
not to participate in the market. Only those with strong trading needs (buyers with ∆ > ∆b and
sellers with ∆ < ∆s) are willing to pay the search cost to participate in the market.
In the steady-state equilibrium, the size of each group of investors remains a constant over time.
The demographic analysis is similar to that in Section 2.3, and is summarized in the appendix.
The steady state equilibrium is summarized in following theorem.
Theorem 2 If the equilibrium with ∆b ≥ ∆s exists, it can be characterized as follows. ∆b and ∆s
are given by
c
λη
=
∆b −∆s
κ+ r
Ns +
κX
κ+ λNb
∫ ∆s
0 F (y) dy
κ+ r + λ (1− η)Nb , (45)
c
λ (1− η) =
∆b −∆s
κ+ r
Nb +
κ (N −X)
κ+ λNs
∫ ∆
∆b
[1− F (x)] dx
κ+ r + ληNs
, (46)
where Ns and Nb are given by (112) and (113). Investors’ distributions are given by (97)–(105).
Every meeting between a buyer and a seller results in a trade, with the price given by (6).
As in Theorem 1, the equilibrium can be fully characterized once the two cutoff points, ∆b and ∆s,
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are obtained. Hence, the existence of the equilibrium boils down to the existence of the solutions
to (45) and (46). The following examines the equilibrium’s existence and other properties.
5.2 The low search cost case: c < c∗
Proposition 17 If c < c∗, there exists at least one non-intermediation equilibrium as characterized
in Theorem 2.
The above proposition, together with Theorem 1, implies that there are at least two non-degenerate
equilibria for the case of c < c∗: the intermediation equilibrium in Theorem 1, and the non-
intermediation equilibrium in Theorem 2. The multiplicity is due to the complementarity in search.
In one equilibrium, investors expect a large number of them to be actively searching in the market,
making it appealing for them to enter the market. The ensuing equilibrium has a large number
of active investors, as in Theorem 1. In the other equilibrium, investors expect a small number of
them to be active, making it unappealing to enter the market in teh first place. Hence, the ensuing
equilibrium has a small number of active investors, as in the equilibrium in Theorem 2.
To gain more insights on the equilibrium in Theorem 2, we analyze the limit case when the
search speed λ goes to infinity. The limit case for Theorem 1 is given by Proposition 16, where the
size of the intermediation sector shrinks to zero. In contrast, the following proposition shows that
the limit case of Theorem 2 is quite different.
Proposition 18 For c < cˆ, when λ is sufficiently large, the equilibrium in Theorem 2 can be
characterized as the following
∆s =
ms1
λ
+ o
(
λ−1
)
, (47)
∆b = ∆− m
b
1
λ
+ o
(
λ−1
)
, (48)
TV =
c2 (κ+ r)2
η (1− η) ∆2
1
λ
+ o
(
λ−1
)
, (49)
where mb1 and m
s
1 are positive constants and are given by (127) and (128).
Note first that cˆ is the limit of c∗ when λ goes to ∞, and is given by (44). The above proposition
shows that the limit of the equilibrium in Theorem 2 is unique. Hence, combined with the results
in Theorem 1, we can conclude that there are only two equilibria when c < cˆ and λ goes to infinity.
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There is almost no trade in the equilibrium in Proposition 18, when λ approaches infinity.
Equations (47) and (48) imply that the numbers of buyers and sellers both converge to zero.
Equation (49) shows that the trading volume in this equilibrium also converges to zero. Hence,
asset owners expect to hold the asset forever as the chance of selling it is infinitesimal.
The logic behind these counterintuitive results is as follows. In the “normal” equilibrium in
Theorem 1, when the search speed is high, many investors find it worth participating in the market.
However, as demonstrated in Theorem 2, an alternative equilibrium can also be sustained when
very few investors are expected to be active in the market. This expectation prevents investors
from participating except for those with extreme valuations, which in turn sustains the expectation
of few active investors. Hence, in this “perverse” equilibrium, the higher the speed, the fewer the
active investors. When the speed goes to infinity, the number of active investors approaches zero.
Hence, we refer to the equilibrium in Proposition 18 as an “almost no trade equilibrium.”
Another interesting limit case is when the search cost c goes to 0. As shown in Proposition 6,
the equilibrium in Theorem 1 converges to the equilibrium in Hugonnier, Lester, and Weill (2016),
where all investors trade. In sharp contrast, the following proposition shows that the equilibrium in
Theorem 2 converges to an “almost no trade” equilibrium, when the search cost approaches zero.
Proposition 19 When c goes to 0, the equilibrium in Theorem 2 has the following unique limit:
lim
c→0
∆b = ∆, (50)
lim
c→0
∆s = 0, (51)
and the resulting trading volume converges to 0.
The intuition is similar to that for Proposition 18, when it is cheap to search, the preverse equi-
librium can only be sustained when very few investors are expected to participate in the market.
When c approaches 0, the size of active investors approaches 0.
5.3 The high search cost case: c ≥ c∗
The equilibrium in Theorem 2 may not exist if the search cost is large. For example, when c is
sufficiently large, no investor would enter the market to search since the expected search cost is
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too high relative to the expected gain from trade. Hence, Theorem-2-type equilibrium does not
exists. When λ is sufficiently large, however, we can establish the existence and characterize the
equilibrium in Theorem 2.
Proposition 20 For c > cˆ, when λ is sufficiently large, there are only two equilibria. The first is
given by (47)–(49) in Proposition 18. The second one is given by
∆s = ∆w +
ms2√
λ
+ o
(
λ−1/2
)
, (52)
∆b = ∆w +
mb2√
λ
+ o
(
λ−1/2
)
, (53)
TV = TVw + o
(
λ−1
)
, (54)
where ms2 and m
b
2 are given by (137) and by (138) .
The above proposition shows that similar to the results in Section 5.2, there are also two asymptotic
equilibria when c > c∗. The first one is the “almost no trade” equilibrium in Proposition 18. The
second one is similar to that in Proposition 16. We refer to it as an “almost Walrasian equilibrium”
since it converges to the Walrasian equilibrium. That is, as λ goes to infinity, both ∆b and ∆s
converge to ∆w. As in Proposition 16, the prices and allocation converge to their counterparts in
a centralized market equilibrium. However, in contrast to the result in Proposition 16, the trading
volume in this case also converges to that in a centralized market equilibrium. This result further
confirms our earlier intuition that, in the intermediation equilibrium in Section 2, the difference
between TV and TVw is due to the extra trading generated by intermediaries acting as middlemen.
5.4 Stability
Previous analysis shows that there are multiple non-degenerate equilibria. Which one is more
robust? To analyze this, we adopt the following notion of stability. Imagine a small perturbation
to non-owners’ decision rule (3) in an equilibrium. Then, let owners adjust their decision rule (4),
taking the perturbation as given. Then, taking owners’ adjustment as given, non-owners adjust
their decision rule. This process is reiterated. An equilibrium is said to be stable if both owners and
non-owners’ decision rules converge back to those in the original equilibrium. Specifically, imagine
a perturbation to non-owners’ decision rule (3), i.e., the cutoff point becomes ∆b(1) = ∆b+, where
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 is a sufficiently small quantity.7 Then, owners’ adjust their decision (4), taking ∆b(1) as given.
Denote their cutoff point as ∆s(1). Then, non-owners take ∆s(1) as given and adjust their decision
rule (3), leading to a cutoff point ∆b(2). This process is repeated and the cutoff points after n
iterations are denoted as ∆b(n) and ∆s(n). An equilibrium is said to be stable if there exists a
finite quantity ∗, such that for any perturbation  < ∗, we have
lim
n−→∞∆b(n) = ∆b,
lim
n−→∞∆s(n) = ∆s.
Otherwise, the equilibrium is said to be unstable.
Proposition 21 The equilibrium in Theorem 1 is stable. When λ is sufficiently large, the almost-
no-trade” equilibrium in Theorem 2 is unstable but the almost-Walrasian equilibrium is stable.
The above proposition shows that when the search cost is small, i.e., c < c∗, the intermediation
equilibrium is stable, while the non-intermediation equilibrium in Theorem 2 is unstable if λ is
sufficiently large. Similarly, in the case with a large search cost c > c∗, when the search speed is
sufficiently fast, the almost-no-trade equilibrium in (47)–(49) is unstable and the almost-Walrasian
equilibrium in (52)–(54) is stable. In other words, in our model, stable equilibria are those that
converge to the Walrasian equilibrium (except for the trading volume) when λ goes to infinity, and
unstable equilibria are those that converge to no-trade equilibrium when λ goes to infinity.
Finally, with the above results, we can further compare our model with Hugonnier, Lester, and
Weill (2016), where the search cost is zero. Once we introduce the search cost into the model,
multiple non-degenerate equilibria arise. One equilibrium is characterized by Theorem 1 and is
stable, while the other is characterized by Theorem 2 and is unstable (if λ is sufficiently large).
When the search cost in our model converges to zero, the stable equilibrium converges to the
equilibrium in Hugonnier, Lester, and Weill (2016), while the unstable equilibrium converges to the
degenerate no-trade equilibrium.
7The same conclusion arises, if the initial perturbation is on owners’, rather than non-owners’, decision rule.
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6 Empirical Analysis
In this section, we conduct empirical tests of the model predictions on the intermediation chain
length L and the price dispersion ratio DR in Section 3. We choose to analyze the U.S. corporate
bond market, which is organized as an OTC market. Moreover, a large panel dataset is available
that makes it possible to conduct the tests reliably. Finally, some of the propositions in Section 3
were proved under the condition that λ is sufficiently large. It might be natural to expect that the
search speed in the corporate bond market in the U.S. is sufficiently fast.
6.1 Hypotheses
Our analysis in Section 3 provides predictions on the effects of search cost c, market size X, trading
need κ, and search technology λ. There is perhaps little variation in the search technology λ across
corporate bonds in our sample during 2002–2012. Hence, our empirical analysis will focus on the
cross-sectional analysis on the effects of c, X, and κ.
Specifically, we obtain a number of observable variables that can be used as proxies for these
three parameters. Table 1 summarizes the interpretations of our proxies and model predictions.
We use issuance size as a proxy for the market size X. Another variable that captures the effect of
market size is bond age, i.e., the number of years since issuance. The idea is that after a corporate
bond is issued, as time goes by, a larger and larger fraction of the issuance reaches long-term buy-
and-hold investors such as pension funds and insurance companies. Hence, the active size of the
market becomes smaller as the bond age increases. With these interpretations, Propositions 8 and
12 imply that the intermediation chain length L and price dispersion ratio DR should be decreasing
in the issuance size, but increasing in bond age.
We use turnover as a proxy for the frequency of investors’ trading need κ. The higher the
turnover, the more frequent the trading needs are. Propositions 9 and 12 imply that the chain
length L and dispersion ratio DR should be increasing in turnover.
As proxies for the search cost c, we use credit rating, time to maturity, and effective bid-ask
spread. The idea is that these variables are related to the cost that dealers face. For example,
all else being equal, it is cheaper for dealers to make market for investment-grade bonds than for
high-yield or non-rated bonds, perhaps because dealers face less inventory risk and less capital
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charge for holding investment-grade bonds. Hence, our interpretation is that the search cost c is
smaller for investment-grade bonds. Moreover, bonds with longer maturities are more risky, and
so more costly for dealers to make market (i.e., c is higher). Finally, everything else being equal,
a larger effective bid-ask spread implies a higher profit for dealers (i.e., c is lower). With these
interpretations, Propositions 4 and 12 imply that the chain length L and price dispersion ratio DR
should be larger for investment-grade bonds, and for bonds with shorter time to maturity or larger
bid-ask spreads.
Our goal here is to assess if our model can describe the behavior of intermediation chains and
price dispersion in the corporate bond market. We are certainly not drawing causality inferences.
Rather, we attempt to examine if the correlations appear consistent with the model implications
in equilibrium. We keep in mind the possible endogeneity of the independent variables, especially
the effective bid-ask spread, and re-run our analysis after dropping this variable.
6.2 Data
Our sample consists of corporate bonds that were traded in the U.S. between July 2002 and De-
cember 2012. We combine two databases: the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE)
and the Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD). TRACE contains information about corporate
bond transactions, such as date, time, price, and volume of a transaction. The dataset also classi-
fies all transactions into “dealer-to-customer” or “dealer-to-dealer” transactions.8 We rely on this
classification to construct our measure of chain length L and price dispersion ratio DR.
The FISD database contains information about a bond’s characteristics, such as bond type, date
and amount of issuance, maturity, and credit rating. We merge the two databases using 9-digit
CUSIPs. The initial sample from TRACE contains a set of 64,961 unique CUSIPs; among them,
54,587 can be identified in FISD. We include in our final sample corporate debentures ($8.5 trillion
total issuance amount, or 62% of the sample), medium-term notes ($2.2 trillion total issuance
amount, or 16% of the sample), and convertibles ($0.6 trillion issuance amount, or 4% of the
sample). In total, we end up with a sample of 25,836 bonds with a total issuance amount of $11.3
trillion.
8According to TRACE User Guide, FINRA members are classified as “dealers” and non-FINRA member institu-
tions and retail accounts are classified as “customers.”
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Following (26), we compute the chain length L for each corporate bond during each period,
where TVcd +TVdc is the total dealer-to-customer trading volume and TVdd is the total dealer-to-
dealer trading volume during that period. Following equation (31), we compute the price dispersion
ratio, DR, for each bond and time period, where P dmax and P
d
min are the maximum and minimum
transaction prices among dealer-to-dealer transactions according to the classification by TRACE,
and Pmax and Pmin are the maximum and minimum transaction prices among all transactions.
We obtain the history of credit ratings on the bond level from FISD. For each bond, we construct
its credit rating history at the daily frequency: for each day, we use credit rating by S&P if it is
available, otherwise, we use Moody’s rating if it is available, and use Fitch’s rating if both S&P
and Moody’s ratings are unavailable. In the case that a bond is not rated by any of the three credit
rating agencies, we classify it as “not rated.” We use the rating on the last day of the period to
create a dummy variable IG , which equals one if a bond has an investment-grade rating, and zero
otherwise. We use Maturity denote the time to maturity of a bond, measured in years, use Age to
denote the time since issuance of a bond, denominated in years, use Size to denote issuance size
of a bond, denominated in million dollars, and use Turnover to denote the total trading volume
of a bond during the period, normalized by its Size. To measure the effective bid-ask spread of a
bond, denoted as Spread, we follow Bao, Pan, and Wang (2011) to compute the square root of the
negative of the first-order autocovariance of changes in consecutive transaction prices during the
period, which is based on Roll (1984)’s measure of effective bid-ask spread.
6.3 Summary statistics
Table 2 reports the summary statistics for variables measured at the monthly frequency. To rule
out extreme outliers, which are likely due to data error, we winsorize our sample by dropping
observations below the 1st percentile and above 99th percentile. For the overall sample, the average
chain length is 1.73. There is significant variation. The chain length is 7.00 and 1.00 at the 99th
and 1st percentiles, respectively. For investment-grade bonds, the average chain length is 1.81 and
the 99th percentile is 7.53, both higher than their counterparts for the overall sample.
The average price dispersion ratio is 0.50 for the overall sample, and 0.51 for investment-grade
bonds. For the overall sample, the average turnover is 0.08 per month and the average issuance size
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is $462 million. Investment-grade bonds have a larger average issuance size of $537 million, and a
turnover of 0.07. The effective bid-ask spread is 1.43% for the overall sample, and 1.32% for the
investment-grade subsample. The average bond age is around 5 years and the time to maturity is
around 8 years.
6.4 Cross-sectional analysis
We run Fama-MacBeth regressions of chain length on the variables in Table 1, and the results
are reported in Table 3. As shown in column 1, the signs of all coefficients are consistent with
the model predictions, and all coefficients are highly significantly different from 0. The coefficient
for IG is 0.245 (t = 32.17) implying that, holding everything else constant, the chain length for
investment-grade bonds is longer than that for other bonds by 0.245 on average, which is significant
given that the mean chain length is 1.73.
The coefficient for Turnover is 0.199 (t = 11.48), suggesting that the chain length increases with
the frequency of investors’ trading needs. The coefficients for Size and Age are −0.012 (t = 3.73)
and 0.025 (t = 23.92), implying that the chain length is decreasing in the size of the market. Also
consistent with the model prediction, the coefficient for Maturity is significantly negative. The
coefficient for Spread is 0.073 (t = 17.17). Under the interpretation that a higher spread implies a
lower search cost for dealers, this is consistent our model that the chain length is decreasing in the
search cost.
We then run another Fama-MacBeth regression, with DR as the dependent variable. Our
model predicts that the signs of coefficients for all the variables should be the same as those in the
regression for L. As shown in the third column of Table 3, this is the case for five out of the six
coefficients. For example, as shown in the third column of Table 3, the coefficient for IG is 0.007
(t = 2.62) implying that, holding everything else constant, the price dispersion for investment grade
bonds is larger than that for other bonds by 0.007 on average. Similarly, as implied by our model,
the coefficients for other variables such as Turnover, Age, Maturity, and Spread are all significant
and have the same sign as in the regression for L.
The only exception is the coefficient for Size. Contrary to our model prediction, the coefficient
is significantly positive. Intuitively, our model implies that, for a larger bond, it is easier to find
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trading partners. Hence, it is less profitable for dealers, leading to a smaller intermediary sector,
and consequently a shorter intermediation chain and a smaller price dispersion ratio. However,
our evidence is only consistent with the implication on the chain length. One conjecture is that
our model abstracts away from the variation in transaction size and dealers’ inventory capacity
constraints. For example, in our sample, the monthly maximum transaction size for the largest
10% of the bonds is more than 50 times larger than that for the smallest 10% of the bonds. When
facing extremely large transactions from customers, with inventory capacity constraints, a dealer
may have to offer price concessions when trading with other dealers, leading to a larger price
dispersion ratio. However, this channel has a much weaker effect on the chain length, which reflects
the average number of layers of intermediation and so is less sensitive to the transactions of extreme
sizes. As a result, our model prediction on the chain length holds but the prediction on the price
dispersion does not.
As a robustness check, we reconstruct all variables at the quarterly frequency and repeat our
analysis. As shown in the second and fourth columns, the results at the quarterly frequency are
similar to those at the monthly frequency. The only difference is that the coefficient for Maturity
becomes insignificant.
In summary, despite its simple structure, our model appears to describe reasonably well the
intermediary sector in the U.S. corporate bond market. Especially, the dispersion ratio DR is
constructed based on price data while the chain length L is based on quantity data. Yet, for almost
all our proxies, their coefficients have the same sign across the two regressions for DR and L, as
implied by our model.
7 Conclusion
We analyze a search model with an endogenous intermediary sector and intermediation chains. The
equilibrium is characterized in closed-form. Our model shows that the length of the intermediation
chain and price dispersion ratio are decreasing in search cost, search speed, market size, but are
increasing in investors’ trading need. Based on the data from the U.S. corporate bond market, our
evidence is broadly consistent with the model predictions.
Our model has multiple non-degenerate equilibria. In one equilibrium, investors expect a large
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number of them to be active in the market, making it appealing for them to enter the market. The
ensuing equilibrium has a large number of active investors and trading, and some investors become
intermediaries if the search cost is small enough. In the other equilibrium, investors expect few of
them to be active, making it unappealing to enter the market in the first place. The ensuing equilib-
rium has a small number of active investors, low trading volume, and no intermediation. Moreover,
the active equilibrium is “stable” in the sense that it can “recover” from small perturbations, but
the inactive equilibrium is unstable, if the search speed is sufficiently fast.
Finally, as the search speed goes to infinity, the search-market equilibrium does not always
converge to a centralized-market equilibrium. For example, in the intermediation equilibrium, as
the search speed goes to infinity, all the prices and asset allocations converge to their counterparts
in a centralize market equilibrium, but the trading volume in the search-market equilibrium remains
higher, because intermediaries act as “middlemen” and generate “excess” trading.
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8 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1
The proof is organized as follows. Step I, we take ∆b, ∆s and decision rules (3) and (4) as given
to derive densities µs (∆), µb (∆), µn (∆), µh (∆). Step II, from the two indifference conditions at
∆b and ∆s, we obtains equations (20) and (21) that pin down ∆b and ∆s. Step III, we verify that
decision rules (3) and (4) are indeed optimal for all investors.
Step I. We now show that µi(∆) for i = b, s, h, n are given by following. For ∆ ∈ [0,∆b),
µb (∆) = µh (∆) = 0, (55)
µn (∆) =
κ (N −X) + λNbN
κ+ λNb
f (∆) , (56)
µs (∆) =
κX
κ+ λNb
f (∆) . (57)
For ∆ ∈ (∆b,∆s),
µn (∆) = µh (∆) = 0, (58)
µs (∆) =
Nf (∆)
2
1− N −NF (∆)−X − κλ√[
N −NF (∆)−X − κλ
]2
+ 4κλ (N −X) [1− F (∆)]
 , (59)
µb (∆) =
Nf (∆)
2
1 + N −NF (∆)−X − κλ√[
N −NF (∆)−X − κλ
]2
+ 4κλ (N −X) [1− F (∆)]
 . (60)
For ∆ ∈ (∆s,∆],
µn (∆) = µs (∆) = 0, (61)
µb (∆) =
κ (N −X)
κ+ λNs
f (∆) , (62)
µh (∆) =
κX + λNsN
κ+ λNs
f (∆) . (63)
From (3) and (4), we have (55), (58), and (61). Substituting (61) into (12), we obtain
µb (∆) + µh (∆) = Nf (∆) .
From the above equation and (14), we obtain (62) and (63). The market clearing condition (19),
together with (55) and (58), implies that∫ ∆
∆s
µh (∆) d∆ +Ns = X.
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Substituting (63) into the above equation, we get an equation of Ns,
N2s +
(κ
λ
+N −X −NF (∆s)
)
Ns − κX
λ
F (∆s) = 0,
from which we get
Ns =
1
2
√[κ
λ
+N −X −NF (∆s)
]2
+ 4
κX
λ
F (∆s)− 1
2
[κ
λ
+N −X −NF (∆s)
]
. (64)
The derivation for the region ∆ ∈ [0,∆b) is similar. We obtain (56) and (57), with
N2b +
(κ
λ
−N +X +NF (∆b)
)
Nb − κ
λ
(N −X) [1− F (∆b)] = 0. (65)
Solving the above equation for Nb, we obtain
Nb =
N−NF (∆b)−X− κλ
2
+
1
2
√[
N −NF (∆b)−X− κ
λ
]2
+ 4
κ
λ
(N −X) [1−F (∆b)]. (66)
The derivation for the region ∆ ∈ (∆b,∆s) is the following. We rewrite (18) as
κ
dFs (∆)
d∆
= κXf (∆)− λ [Nb − Fb (∆)] dFs (∆)
d∆
+ λFs (∆)
dFb (∆)
d∆
. (67)
After some algebra, we get
κ
dFs (∆)
d∆
= κXf (∆)− d
d∆
[λ (Nb − Fb (∆))Fs (∆)] .
Integrating both sides from ∆b to ∆ ∈ (∆b,∆s), we have
κ [Fs (∆)−Fs (∆b)] = κX [F (∆)−F (∆b)]−λ [(Nb − Fb (∆))Fs (∆)−NbFs (∆b)] , (68)
where we have used the fact that Fb (∆b) = 0.
Substituting (57) into the definition of Fs (·), we have
Fs (∆b) =
κX
κ+ λNb
F (∆b) . (69)
Substituting (58) into (12), we get
µs (∆) + µb (∆) = Nf (∆) . (70)
We can rewite the above equation as
dFb (∆)
d∆
+
dFs (∆)
d∆
= Nf (∆) .
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Integrating both sides from ∆b to ∆ ∈ (∆b,∆s], after some algebra, we obtain
Fs (∆) = Fs (∆b)− Fb (∆) +N [F (∆)− F (∆b)] . (71)
Substituting (69) and (71) into (68), we get a quadratic euqation of Fb (∆), from which we obtain
the solution for Fb (∆). Differentiating it with respect to ∆, we obtain µb (∆) in (60). From (70)
we obtain µs (∆) in (59).
Step II. Let’s first determine Vn (∆) and Vh (∆) for ∆ ∈
[
0,∆
]
. Equation (10) implies that
Vn (∆) is a constant for all ∆. We denote it by Vn ≡ Vn (∆). Equation (8) implies that Vh (∆) is
linear in ∆ with a positive slope
dVh (∆)
d∆
=
1
κ+ r
. (72)
We now compute the slope for Vs (∆) for the region ∆ ∈ [0,∆b). From (9), we have
Vs (∆) =
1 + ∆− c
κ+ r
+
κE [max {Vh (∆′) , Vs (∆′)}]
κ+ r
+
λ (1− η)
κ+ r
∫ ∆s
∆b
[Vs (x) + Vn − Vb (x)− Vs (∆)]µb (x) dx
+
λ (1− η)
κ+ r
∫ ∆
∆s
[Vh (x) + Vn − Vb (x)− Vs (∆)]µb (x) dx.
Differentiating both sides of the equation with respect to ∆, we obtain
dVs (∆)
d∆
=
1
κ+ r + λ (1− η)Nb . (73)
Similarly, for ∆ ∈ (∆b,∆s), we get
dVs (∆)
d∆
=
1
κ+ r
− λ (1− η)
κ+ r
[
dVs (∆)
d∆
− dVb (∆)
d∆
] ∫ ∆
∆
µb (x) dx. (74)
Let’s now determine the slope for Vb (∆) for ∆ ∈
(
∆s,∆
]
. From (11), we have
Vb (∆) = − c
κ+ r
+
κE [max {Vb (∆′) , Vn}]
κ+ r
+
λη
κ+ r
∫ ∆b
0
[Vh (∆) + Vn (x)− Vb (∆)− Vs (x)]µs (x) dx
+
λη
κ+ r
∫ ∆s
∆b
[Vh (∆) + Vb (x)− Vb (∆)− Vs (x)]µs (x) dx.
Differentiating both sides with respect to ∆, after some algebra, we obtain
dVb (∆)
d∆
=
1
κ+ r
ληNs
κ+ r + ληNs
for ∆ ∈ (∆s,∆] . (75)
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Similarly, for ∆ ∈ (∆b,∆s), we have
dVb (∆)
d∆
=
λη
κ+ r
[
dVs (∆)
d∆
− dVb (∆)
d∆
] ∫ ∆
0
µs (x) dx. (76)
From (74) and (76), we can solve for the dVs(∆)d∆ and
dVs(∆)
d∆ for ∆ ∈ (∆b,∆s). Then, we have
dVs (∆)
d∆
=
{
1
κ+r+λ(1−η)Nb for ∆ ∈ [0,∆b)
1
κ+r
κ+r+ληFs(∆)
κ+r+λ(1−η)[Nb−Fb(∆)]+ληFs(∆) for ∆ ∈ (∆b,∆s)
, (77)
dVb (∆)
d∆
=
{
1
κ+r
ληFs(∆)
κ+r+λ(1−η)[Nb−Fb(∆)]+ληFs(∆) for ∆ ∈ (∆b,∆s)
1
κ+r
ληNs
κ+r+ληNs
for ∆ ∈ (∆s,∆] . (78)
From the above expressions for the slopes, we obtain the following
Vn =
κ
r
∫ ∆s
∆b
dVb (z)
dz
[1− F (z)] dz + κ
r
1
κ+ r
ληNs
κ+ r + ληNs
∫ ∆
∆s
[1− F (z)] dz. (79)
Vb (∆) = Vn +
{ ∫ ∆
∆b
dVb(z)
dz dz for z ∈ [∆b,∆s]∫ ∆s
∆b
dVb(z)
dz dz +
1
κ+r
ληNs
κ+r+ληNs
(∆−∆s) for z ∈
(
∆s,∆
] , (80)
Vh (∆) = Vh (∆s) +
∆−∆s
κ+ r
, (81)
Vs (∆) = Vs (∆b) +
{
∆−∆b
κ+r+λNb(1−η) for z ∈ [0,∆b)∫ ∆
∆b
dVs(z)
dz dz for z ∈
(
∆b,∆
] , (82)
where
Vh (∆s) =
1+∆s
r
− κ
r
∫ ∆b
0 F (z) dz
κ+ r + λNb (1− η) −
κ
r
∫ ∆s
∆b
dVs (z)
dz
F (z) dz +
κ
r
∫ ∆
∆s
[1− F (z)] dz
κ+ r
,
Vs (∆b) = Vh (∆s)−
∫ ∆s
∆b
dVs (z)
dz
dz.
We now verify (7): Suppose x ∈ (∆b,∆s) and y ∈ (∆b,∆s). Define ξ (∆) for ∆ ∈ (∆b,∆s) as
ξ (∆) ≡ dVs (∆)
d∆
− dVb (∆)
d∆
. (83)
Then, we have S (x, y) =
∫ x
y ξ (z) dz. Hence, S (x, y) > 0 if and only if x > y. The verification for
other values for x and y is straightforward.
We now derive the value for ∆b and ∆s. Substituting ∆ = ∆b into (11), we then obtain
Vb (∆b) = − c
κ+ r
+ Vn +
λη
κ+ r
κX
κ+ λNb
∫ ∆b
0 F (x) dx
κ+ r + λ (1− η)Nb .
Substituting the indifference condition Vb (∆b) = Vn into the above equation, we obtain (20). From
the monotonicity of the right hand side of (20) and its boundary conditions at ∆b = 0 and ∆b = ∆,
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we know that equation (20) has a unique solution ∆b ∈ [0,∆]. Similarly, substituting ∆ = ∆s in
(9), after some algebra, we obtain
Vs (∆s) = Vh (∆s)− c
κ+ r
+
λ (1− η)
κ+ r
κ (N −X)
κ+ λNs
∫ ∆
∆s
[1− F (x)] dx
κ+ r + ληNs
.
Substituting the indifference condition Vs (∆s) = Vh (∆s) into the above equation, we obtain (21).
From the monotonicity of the right hand side of (21) and its boundary conditions at ∆s = 0 and
∆s = ∆, we know that equation (21) has a unique solution ∆s ∈ [0,∆].
Equation (20) implies that ∆b is increasing in c and equation (21) implies that ∆s is decreasing
in c. Denote the implied functions as ∆b(c) and ∆s(c), respectively. Let c
∗ be the solution to
∆b(c
∗) = ∆s(c∗). (84)
The monotonicity and boundary conditions imply that the above equation has a unique solution,
and that ∆b < ∆s for any c < c
∗.
Step III. We now verify the optimal choices (3) and (4). We can prove both by contradiction.
Let’s first consider the case for an owner with ∆ ∈ (∆s,∆]. Suppose this owner deviates from
the equilibrium choice (4), i.e, rather than staying inactive, he searches in the market during a
period [t, t+ dt) and then returns to the equilibrium strategy (3) and (4). Let’s use V̂o (∆) to
denote the investor’s expected utility if he follows this alternative strategy:
V̂o (∆) = (1 + ∆− c) dt+ κE
[
max
{
Vh
(
∆′
)
, Vs
(
∆′
)}]
dt
+λdt (1− η)
∫ ∆
∆
Ŝ (x,∆)µb (x) dx+ e
−rdt (1− κdt)Vh (∆) ,
where Ŝ (x,∆) denotes the trading surplus if this owner meets a buyer of type x > ∆:
Ŝ (x,∆) = Vh (x) + Vb (∆)− Vb (x)− V̂o (∆) ,
where we have used the result that the trading surplus is negative if the buyer’s type is lower than
the owner. For the owner to deviate, it has to be the case that V̂o (∆) > Vh (∆). Hence, the trade
surplus is bounded by
Ŝ (x,∆) < Vh (x) + Vb (∆)− Vb (x)− Vh (∆) .
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Substituting (80) into the right hand side of the above inequality, we obtain
Ŝ (x,∆) <
x−∆
κ+ r + ληNs
. (85)
By comparing V̂o (∆) and Vh (∆), we obtain
V̂o (∆)− Vh (∆) = −cdt+ λdt (1− η)
∫ ∆
∆
Ŝ (x,∆)µb (x) dx. (86)
Substituting (85) and (62) into the above equation, we obtain
V̂o (∆)− Vh (∆) < −
λ (1− η)κ (N −X) ∫ ∆∆s [1− F (x)] dx
(κ+ λNs) (κ+ r + ληNs)
dt < 0. (87)
This contradicts V̂o (∆) > Vh (∆). The proofs for other values for ∆ and the decision rule (3) are
similar.
Proof of Propositions 1–3
Propositions 1 and 2 can be obtained by differentiation. To prove Proposition 3, note that TVcc is
the total volume of trades between sellers with types [0,∆b), whose population size is Fs (∆b), and
buyers with types
(
∆s,∆
]
, whose population size is Nb − Fb (∆s). Note that any meeting between
the two groups will lead to a trade. Hence, the total volume is given by (22). By the same logic,
we obtain TVcc and TVdc in (23) and (24).
TVdd is the total volume of trades between sellers with types y ∈ (∆b,∆s) and buyers with
types x ∈ (∆b,∆s). However, trade occurs if and only if x > y. For any ∆ ∈ (∆b,∆s), the density
of buyers is dFb (∆). They only trade with sellers whose types are below ∆, and whose population
size is Fs (∆) − Fs (∆b). Hence, type-∆ investors’ trading volume is λ [Fs (∆)− Fs (∆b)] dFb (∆).
Integrating this volume for ∆ ∈ (∆b,∆s), we obtain (25).
Proof of Proposition 4–6
Based on equations (20) and (66), after some tedious algebra, we obtain d∆bdc > 0 and
dNb
dc < 0.
Similarly, Equations (21) and (64) imply d∆sdc > 0 and
dNs
dc < 0. Differentiating L with respect to
c, we can obtain dLdc < 0. From (20) and (21), we can see that c = 0 implies that ∆b = 0, and
∆s = ∆. This implies that Nb = N −X, Ns = X, and L =∞.
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Proof of Proposition 7
Denote the limit of ∆b and ∆s under λ→∞ by
∆∞b ≡ lim
λ→∞
∆b,
∆∞s ≡ lim
λ→∞
∆s.
We can rewrite (20) as
λN2b +
(
κ+
κ+ r
1− η
)
Nb +
κ (κ+ r)
(1− η)λ =
κηX
(1− η) c
∫ ∆b
0
F (x) dx. (88)
When λ goes to infinity, the right hand side of (88) converges to a positive constant (it is easy to
see that ∆∞b 6= 0):
lim
λ→∞
κηX
(1− η) c
∫ ∆b
0
F (x) dx =
κηX
(1− η) c
∫ ∆∞b
0
F (x) dx.
Hence, the left hand side of (88) also converges to this postive constant, which implies
Nb =
Mb√
λ
+ o
(
λ−1/2
)
, where Mb =
√
κηX
(1− η) c
∫ ∆∞b
0
F (x) dx. (89)
Substituting the above equation into (65),
[NF(∆b)−N+X]
(
Mb√
λ
+ o(λ−1/2)
)
+
1
λ
(
M2b − κ (N −X) [1− F (∆∞b )]
)
+ o(
1
λ
) = 0. (90)
The above equation implies that
NF (∆b)−N +X = O( 1√
λ
).
From the above equation, we have
∆∞b = ∆w,
∆b −∆∞b = O(
1√
λ
). (91)
where ∆w ≡ F−1
(
N−X
N
)
. Hence, we can write (91) as
∆b = ∆w +
mb√
λ
+ o
(
λ−1/2
)
, (92)
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where mb is a constant. Substituting this expression of ∆b into (90), and setting the coefficient of
1/λ to zero, we obtain
mb =
1
Nf (∆w)
[
κX
(
1− XN
)
Mb
−Mb
]
.
Following a similar logic, we obtain
∆∞s = ∆w
Ns =
Ms√
λ
+ o
(
λ−1/2
)
with Ms =
√
κ (1− η) (N −X)
ηc
∫ ∆
∆w
[1− F (x)] dx, (93)
∆s = ∆w +
ms√
λ
+ o
(
λ−1/2
)
with ms =
1
Nf (∆w)
[
Ms −
κX
(
1− XN
)
Ms
]
. (94)
Finally, we can verify that ∆s > ∆b is equivalent to ms > mb, which is equivalent to c < cˆ.
From ∆b, ∆s, Nb, Ns, we can obtain all other equilibrium quantities in the asymptotic case.
With the above results, we can write L as
L = ln
cˆ
c
+
Z√
λ
g
(c
cˆ
)
+ o
(
λ−1/2
)
, (95)
where Z is a positive constant and is given by
Z ≡ κ
2Nc
√ ηX
(N −X) (1− η)
∫ ∆w
∆
F (y)
F (∆w)
dy +
√
(N −X) (1− η)
ηX
∫ ∆
∆w
1− F (x)
1− F (∆w)dx
 ,
and g (·) is the following function
g (x) ≡ 3x−
(
1 +
1
x
)
lnx− 1, for x ∈ [0, 1].
It is easy to show that g (x) > 0. Hence, (95) implies dLdλ < 0 when λ is sufficiently large.
Proof of Propositions 8–9
Equation (95) implies that when λ is sufficiently large, we have ∂L∂κ > 0, and that under condition
(27), we have ∂L∂X < 0. To prove the rest of the two propositions, we expand ∆s−∆b as the following
∆s −∆b = Y√
λ
+ o
(
λ−1/2
)
,
where Y is given by
Y =
1− cĉ
φ
√
Xf (∆w)
√ κη
(1− η) c
∫ ∆w
∆
F (y) dy +
√
κ (1− η)
ηc
(φ− 1)
∫ ∆
∆w
[1− F (x)] dx
 .
The above equation implies that ∂(∆s−∆b)∂κ > 0, and under condition (27),
∂(∆s−∆b)
∂X < 0.
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Proof of Proposition 10 and 11
When λ is sufficiently large, we can expand D as
D =
√
c√
λ
 ∆w√κ(1−η)X
η
∫ ∆w
0 F (x) dx
+
(
∆−∆w
)√
κη(N−X)
(1−η)
∫ ∆
∆w
[1− F (x)] dx
+ o( 1√λ
)
.
Hence, we have ∂D∂λ < 0 and
∂D
∂c > 0.
If c is close to zero, D can be expanded as
D =
∫ ∆s
∆b
ξ (z) dz +O
(√
c
)
,
where ∆s = ∆ − O (
√
c) and ∆b = O (
√
c). It can be shown that ∂∂c
(∫ ∆s
∆b
ξ (z) dz
)
< 0, so we
obtain ∂D∂c < 0 when c is sufficiently small.
Proof of Proposition 12
From the the proof of Proposition 7, we have
P dmax = P (∆s,∆s) ,
P dmin = P (∆b,∆b) .
Substituting them and (29) and (30) into (31), and differentiating it, we obtain ∂DR∂c < 0.
It is easy to show that
P dmax − P dmin = O
(
λ−1
)
,
Pmax − Pmin = O
(
λ−1/2
)
.
It follows that DR = O(λ−1/2). Therefore, ∂DR∂λ < 0 when λ is sufficiently large. Similarly, we can
show that, when λ is sufficiently large, we have
∂
∂κ
(
P dmax − P dmin
)
> 0,
∂
∂κ
(Pmax − Pmin) < 0,
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which implies ∂DR∂κ > 0. Furthermore, under the condition in (27), we can show
P dmax − P dmin = O
(
1
λX
)
,
Pmax − Pmin = O
(
1√
λX
)
,
which implies that DR = O( 1√
λX
). Therefore, when λ is sufficiently large, we have ∂DR∂X < 0.
Proof of Proposition 13
The average expected utility across all investors in the economy is defined by
W ≡ 1
N
∑
i∈{b,s,h,n}
[∫ ∆
0
Vi (∆)µi (∆) d∆
]
.
When λ is sufficiently large, we have the following
W = Ww − mw√
λ
+ o
(
λ−1/2
)
,
where Ww is average expected utility in a centralized market and is given by
Ww =
1
r
∫ ∆
∆w
(1 + ∆) d∆,
and mW is given by
mw =
1
r
√
κc
η (1− η)X
√ 1
φ
(
1− 1
φ
)∫ ∆
∆w
[1− F (x)] dx+ 1
φ
√∫ ∆w
∆
F (x) dx
 .
By examining mw, we can obtain all the conclusions in this proposition.
Proof Proposition 14
The social welfare, denoted by W e, is the discounted sum of all realized cash flows from holding
the asset net of total search cost, i.e.,
W e =
1
r
∫ ∆
0
(1 + ∆) [µh (∆) + µs (∆)] d∆−
1
r
c (Nb +Ns) .
where µh (·) and µs (·) are given in Theorem 1. After some algebra, the social planner’s the first-
order condition with respect to ∆s can be simplified to
c =
∫ ∆
∆s
1− F (∆)
1− F (∆s)d∆
X−Ns
1−F (∆s)
(
2Ns −X + κλ
)
+
(
NX − 2NNs − κXλ
)
NNs +
κX
λ
.
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When λ is sufficiently large, we have the following asymptotics
∆es = ∆w +
mes√
λ
+ o(λ−1/2),
N es =
M es√
λ
+ o(λ−1/2),
where
mes =
1
Nf (∆w)
[
M es −
κX
(
1− XN
)
M es
]
,
M es =
√
η
1− ηMs.
Similarly, the first order condition with respect to ∆b is given by
c =
κX
∫ ∆b
0 F (∆) d∆
(κ+ λNb)
2 .
When λ is sufficiently large, we have the following asymptotics
∆eb = ∆w +
meb√
λ
+ o(λ−1/2),
N eb =
M eb√
λ
+ o(λ−1/2),
where
meb =
1
Nf (∆w)
[
κX
(
1− XN
)
M eb
−M eb
]
,
M eb =
√
1− η
η
Mb.
When η = 12 , we have M
e
b = Mb and M
e
s = Ms. From (92) and (94), we obtain (32) and (33).
Otherwise, the decentralized equilibrium is generally inefficient. For example, in the case of η > 12 ,
the intermediary sector in the decentralized equilibrium is too big (i.e., ∆s − ∆b > ∆es − ∆eb) if
ηĉb
(1−η)ĉs > 1, and is too small if
ηĉb
(1−η)ĉs < 1, where
ĉb ≡
∫ ∆w
0
F (∆)
F (∆w)
d∆,
ĉs ≡
∫ ∆
∆w
1− F (∆)
1− F (∆w)d∆.
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Proof Proposition 15
In a centralized market, transactions can be executed instantly, hence, all investors whose types
are higher than ∆w are holding the total X units of the asset. This implies
F (∆w) = 1− X
N
, (96)
which leads to (34). Similar to the proof for Theorem 1, we can obtain the expected utility of an
asset owner V co (∆) and of an non-owner V
c
n (∆)
V co (∆) =
1 + ∆ + κE [max {V cn (∆) , V cn (∆) + Pw}]
κ+ r
,
V cn (∆) =
κE [max {V co (∆)− Pw, V cn (∆)}]
κ+ r
.
The indifference condition of a type-∆w investor is
V co (∆) = V
c
n (∆w) + Pw.
The above three equations lead to (35). During [t, t+dt), κXdt investors’ types change. F (∆w) of
them have new types below ∆w, and sell their assets. Hence, the trading volume is given by (36).
Proof Proposition 16
From the asymptotic analysis in the proof of Proposition 7, we obtain (38)–(42). Substituting them
into (22)–(25), we obtain (43).
Proof Theorem 2 and Proposition 19
Step I. For ∆ ∈ (∆b,∆], we have
µs (∆) = µn (∆) = 0. (97)
The inflow-outflow balance equation implies
κdtµb (∆) d∆ + λNsdtµb (∆) d∆ = κdt (N −X) f (∆) d∆,
which, together with (12), implies
µb (∆) =
κ (N −X)
κ+ λNs
f (∆) , (98)
µh (∆) =
κX + λNsN
κ+ λNs
f (∆) . (99)
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For ∆ ∈ [0,∆s), we have
µb (∆) = µh (∆) = 0. (100)
The inflow-outflow balance equation implies
κdtµs (∆) d∆ + λNbdtµs (∆) d∆ = κdtXf (∆) d∆,
which, together with (12), implies
µs (∆) =
κX
κ+ λNb
f (∆) , (101)
µn (∆) =
κ (N −X) + λNbN
κ+ λNb
f (∆) . (102)
For ∆ ∈ [∆s,∆b], we have
µs (∆) = µb (∆) = 0. (103)
The inflow-outflow balance equation implies
κdtµh (∆) d∆ = κdtXf (∆) d∆,
which, together with (12), implies
µh (∆) = Xf (∆) , (104)
µn (∆) = (N −X) f (∆) . (105)
Step II. Note that Nb and Ns can be written as
Nb =
∫ ∆
∆b
µb (∆) d∆ =
κ (N −X)
κ+ λNs
[1− F (∆b)] , (106)
Ns =
∫ ∆s
0
µs (∆) d∆ =
κX
κ+ λNb
F (∆s) , (107)
which can be rewritten as
κNb + λNbNs = κ (N −X) [1− F (∆b)] , (108)
κNs + λNbNs = κXF (∆s) . (109)
Subtracting (109) from (108), we obtain
Nb = Ns + (N −X) [1− F (∆b)]−XF (∆s) . (110)
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Substituting the above equation into (109), we obtain a quadratic equation of Ns
N2s +
[
(N −X) [1− F (∆b)]−XF (∆s) + κ
λ
]
Ns − κ
λ
XF (∆s) = 0. (111)
This equation has a unique positive solution
Ns = −1
2
{
(N −X) [1− F (∆b)]−XF (∆s) + κ
λ
}
+
1
2
√{
(N −X) [1− F (∆b)]−XF (∆s) + κ
λ
}2
+ 4
κ
λ
XF (∆s). (112)
Similarly, we obtain
Nb =
1
2
{
(N −X) [1− F (∆b)]−XF (∆s)− κ
λ
}
+
1
2
√{
(N −X) [1− F (∆b)]−XF (∆s) + κ
λ
}2
+ 4
κ
λ
XF (∆s). (113)
Step III. At the steady state, investors’ optimality condition implies
Vh (∆) =
1 + ∆ + κE [max {Vh (∆′) , Vs (∆′)}]
κ+ r
, (114)
Vs (∆) =
1 + ∆− c
κ+ r
+
λ (1− η)
κ+ r
∫ ∆
∆b
S (x,∆)µb (x) dx+
κE [max {Vh (∆′) , Vs (∆′)}]
κ+ r
, (115)
Vn (∆) =
κE [max {Vn (∆′) , Vb (∆′)}]
κ+ r
, (116)
Vb (∆) =
−c
κ+ r
+
λη
κ+ r
∫ ∆s
0
S (∆, y)µs (y) dy +
κE [max {Vn (∆′) , Vb (∆′)}]
κ+ r
, (117)
where ∆′ is a random variable with a PDF of f (·).
Equation (116) implies that Vn (∆) does not depend on ∆. So we denote it by Vn ≡ Vn (∆).
Equation (114) implies that Vh (∆) is linear in ∆ and can be written as
Vh (∆) = Vh (∆s) +
∆−∆s
κ+ r
, (118)
where the value of Vh (∆s) will be determined later.
Differentiating both sides of (115) with respect to ∆ and rearranging, we obtain
dVs (∆)
d∆
=
1
κ+ r + λ (1− η)Nb for ∆ ∈ [0,∆s] .
Integrating both sides from ∆ to ∆s, we get
Vs (∆) = Vs (∆s)− ∆s −∆
κ+ r + λ (1− η)Nb for ∆ ∈ [0,∆s] .
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To derive the value of Vs (∆s), note that the indifference condition and (114) imply that
Vs (∆s) = Vh (∆s) =
1 + ∆s + κE [max {Vh (∆′) , Vs (∆′)}]
κ+ r
. (119)
We can compute the value of E [max {Vh (∆′) , Vs (∆′)}] as the following
E
[
max
{
Vh
(
∆′
)
, Vs
(
∆′
)}]
=
∫ ∆s
0
Vs (∆) dF (∆) +
∫ ∆
∆s
Vh (∆) dF (∆)
= Vs (∆s)−
∫ ∆s
0 F (∆) d∆
κ+ r + λ (1− η)Nb +
∫ ∆
∆s
[1− F (∆)] d∆
κ+ r
.
Substituting this back ino (119) and rearranging, we obtain
Vs (∆s) =
1 + ∆s
r
− κ
r
∫ ∆s
0 F (∆) d∆
κ+ r + λ (1− η)Nb +
κ
r
∫ ∆
∆s
[1− F (∆)] d∆
κ+ r
.
To derive Vb (∆) for ∆ ∈
[
∆b,∆
]
, we substitute the expression of S(x, y) into (117), and
differentiate both sides with respect to ∆, and obtain
dVb (∆)
d∆
=
λη
κ+ r
[
dVh (∆)
d∆
− dVb (∆)
d∆
]
Ns.
We compute dVh(∆)d∆ from (118) and substitute it into the above equation to obtain
dVb (∆)
d∆
=
1
κ+ r
ληNs
κ+ r + ληNs
for ∆ ∈ [∆b,∆] .
Integrating both sides from ∆b to ∆, we obtain
Vb (∆) = Vb (∆b) +
ληNs
κ+ r + ληNs
∆−∆b
κ+ r
for ∆ ∈ [∆b,∆] . (120)
Note that investors decision rules imply that Vb (∆b) = Vn and Vb (∆) > Vn if ∆ > ∆b. Hence,
substituting (120) into (116), after some algebra, we obtain
Vb (∆b) = Vn =
κ
r
ληNs
κ+ r + ληNs
∫ ∆
∆b
[1− F (z)] dz
κ+ r
. (121)
From the above results, we can verify that S (x, y) > 0 for any for x ∈ [∆b,∆] and y ∈ [0,∆s].
Step IV. We can now pin down the values of ∆b and ∆s. Substituting ∆ = ∆b, Vb (∆b) = Vn, the
expression of S (x, y), Vh (∆b), Vs (∆) and µs (∆) into (117), after some algebra, we obtain (45).
Similarly, substituting ∆ = ∆s, Vs (∆s) = Vh (∆s), the expression of S (x, y), (118), (120), and
µb (∆) into (115), after some algebra, we obtain (46).
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Step V. Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, we can verify that the conjectured decision rules are
optimal for all investors.
To prove Proposition 19, note that from (45) and (46) we obtain (50) and (51), and hence
lim
c→0
Nb = lim
c→0
Ns = lim
c→0
TV = 0.
8.1 Proof of Proposition 17
Define the right hand sides of (45) and (46) as
G1 (∆b,∆s) ≡ ∆b −∆s
κ+ r
Ns (∆b,∆s) +
κX
κ+ λNb (∆b,∆s)
∫ ∆s
0 F (y) dy
κ+ r + λ (1− η)Nb (∆b,∆s) ,(122)
G2 (∆b,∆s) ≡ c
λ (1− η) =
∆b −∆s
κ+ r
Nb +
κ (N −X)
κ+ λNs
∫ ∆
∆b
[1− F (x)] dx
κ+ r + ληNs
. (123)
Equation (45) defines a set S1 ≡
{
(∆b,∆s) |G1 (∆b,∆s) = cλη
}
and equation (46) defines a set S2 ≡{
(∆b,∆s) |G1 (∆b,∆s) = cλ(1−η)
}
. Hence, proving the existence of a non-intermediation equilibrium
is equivalent to proving that S1 ∩ S2 ∩ S3 is not empty, where S3 ≡
{
(∆b,∆s) |0 ≤ ∆s ≤ ∆b ≤ ∆
}
.
We use ∆
(I)
b and ∆
(I)
s to denote the unique solution to equations (20) and (21). One can
verify that (∆
(I)
b ,∆
(I)
b ) ∈ S1 and (∆(I)s ,∆(I)s ) ∈ S2. Moreover, equations (45) and (46) imply that
there exist ∆min and ∆max, such that ∆min ∈ (0,∆(I)b ), ∆max ∈ (∆(I)s ,∆),
(
∆,∆min
) ∈ S1 and
(∆max, 0) ∈ S2. Moreover, for any (∆b,∆s) ∈ S1, we have ∆s ∈ [∆min,∆(I)b ]; for any (∆b,∆s) ∈ S2,
we have ∆b ∈ [∆(I)s ,∆max]. That is, all elements in S1 are in the range [∆min,∆(I)b ] for the ∆s
dimension; all elements in S2 are in the range [∆
(I)
s ,∆max] for the ∆b dimension.
Hence, in the two dimensional space (∆b,∆s), S2 has both elements “above” S1 and ele-
ments“below” S1. On the other hand, S1 has both elements “to the left of” S2 and elements“to
the right of” S2. For example, (∆
(I)
s ,∆
(I)
s ) and (∆max, 0) are in the set S2. The former is “above”
S1 while the latter is “below.” Both (∆
(I)
b ,∆
(I)
b ) and
(
∆,∆min
)
are in the set S1. The former is
“to the left of” S2 while the latter is “to the right of” S2.
Since S1 and S2 are continuous, S1 ∩ S2 is not empty. Moreover, for any (∆b,∆s) ∈ S1 ∩ S2, we
have ∆s ≤ ∆(I)b < ∆(I)s ≤ ∆b. Hence, this element is also in S3.
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8.2 Proof of Propositions 18 and 20
The proof is organized in 3 steps. In step 1, we show that ∆∞s > 0 ⇐⇒ ∆∞b < ∆. Hence, there
are only two possibilities: i) ∆∞s = 0 and ∆∞b = ∆; ii) 0 < ∆
∞
s < ∆
∞
b < ∆. In step 2, we
construct the asymptotic equilibrium for the case ∆∞s = 0 and ∆∞b = ∆. In step 3, we show
that 0 < ∆∞s < ∆∞b < ∆ implies that ∆
∞
s = ∆
∞
b = ∆w. In step 4, we construct the asymptotic
equilibrium for this case.
For convenience, we define the following notations: N∞s = limλ→∞Ns and N∞b = limλ→∞Nb.
Step I. Intuitively, the equation ∆∞s > 0 ⇐⇒ ∆∞b < ∆ states that if there are buyers in the
market, there must be sellers, and vice versa. We can prove it by contradiction. Suppose ∆∞s > 0
and ∆∞b = ∆. We can show that this is inconsistent with (46): From equations (106) and (107),
we have N∞s > 0 and N∞b = 0. Substituting Nb in (106) into (46) we obtain
c
1− η =
∆b −∆s
κ+ r
κ (N −X)
κ
λ +Ns
[1− F (∆b)] + κ (N −X)κ
λ +Ns
∫ ∆
∆b
[1− F (x)] dx
κ+ r + ληNs
. (124)
The above equation is a contradiction since the left hand side is a positive constant but the right
hand side converges to zero when λ goes to infinity. Therefore, ∆∞s > 0 implies ∆∞b < ∆. Similarly,
we can obtain that ∆∞b < ∆ implies ∆
∞
s > 0.
Step II. We now construct the asymptotic equilibrium for the case ∆∞s = 0 and ∆∞b = ∆.
Without loss of generality, we can rewrite ∆s and ∆b as
∆s =
ms1
λβs
+ o
(
λ−βs
)
with m1s > 0, βs > 0,
∆b = ∆− m
b
1
λβb
+ o
(
λ−βb
)
with m1b > 0, βb > 0.
Substituting the above expressions into (45) and (46), after some algebra, we obtain
c
λη
=
κX
κ+ λNb
1
λβs
[
∆f (0)ms1
κ+ r
+
1
2λβs
f (0) (ms1)
2
κ+ r + λ (1− η)Nb
]
, (125)
c
λ (1− η) =
κ (N −X)
κ+ λNs
1
λβb
[
∆f
(
∆
)
mb
κ+ r
+
1
2λβb
f
(
∆
)
(mb)
2
κ+ r + ληNs
]
. (126)
Substituting (107) into (125) , after some algebra, we obtain
λNs =
cf(0)ms1
η
[
∆f (0)ms1
κ+ r
+
1
2λβs
f (0) (ms1)
2
κ+ r + λ (1− η)Nb
]−1
.
53
The above equation implies that λNs = O(1), which, combined with (126), implies that βb = 1.
Similarly, we obtain λNs = O(1) and βs = 1.
Therefore, we can write Nb and Ns as
Nb =
M b1
λ
+ o
(
λ−1
)
,
Ns =
M s1
λ
+ o
(
λ−1
)
.
Substituting them into (45) and (46), after some algebra, we obtain
M s1 =
c (κ+ r)
∆η
,
M b1 =
c (κ+ r)
∆ (1− η) .
Substituting these into (106) and (107), after some algebra, we obtain
mb1 =
M b1 (κ+Ms)
κ (N −X) f (∆) , (127)
ms1 =
M s1 (κ+Mb)
κXf (0)
. (128)
From the above equations, we can obtain (49).
Step III. We now construct the asymptotic equilibrium for the case ∆∞s > 0 and ∆∞b < ∆.
In this case, from (112) and (113), we can obtain that Nb
√
λ = O(1), and Ns
√
λ = O(1). Hence,
we can rewrite Ns as
Ns = M
s
2λ
−1/2 + o
(
λ−1/2
)
. (129)
From (106), we obtain
Nb =
1
λ1−ns
κ (N −X) [1− F (∆∞b )]
M s2
+ o
(
λ−1/2
)
. (130)
Substituting it into (107), we obtain
Ns =
XF (∆∞s )
(N −X) [1− F (∆∞b )]M s2λ−1/2 + o
(
λ−1/2
)
. (131)
Comparing (129) and (131), we have
XF (∆∞s )
(N −X) [1− F (∆∞b )] = 1. (132)
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Equation (124) implies that the limit of the first term of the right hand side is finite, i.e.,
lim
λ→∞
∆b −∆s
κ
λ +Ns
κ (N −X)
κ+ r
[1− F (∆b)] <∞,
which implies
lim
λ→∞
√
λ(∆b −∆s) <∞.
Hence, we have ∆∞b = ∆
∞
s , which, combined with (132), implies
∆∞b = ∆
∞
s = ∆w.
Finally, we rewrite the following variables
∆s = ∆w +
ms2√
λ
+ o(λ−1/2),
∆b = ∆w +
mb2√
λ
+ o(λ−1/2),
Nb =
M b2√
λ
+ o(λ−1/2),
Ns =
M s2√
λ
+ o(λ−1/2).
Substituting these variables into (45) and (46) and matching the coefficients of 1/λ; and substituting
these variables into (110) and (111), matching the coefficients of 1/
√
λ, we obtain
c
η
=
mb2 −ms2
κ+ r
M s2 +
κX
M b2
∫ ∆w
0 F (y) dy
(1− η)M b2
, (133)
c
1− η =
mb2 −ms2
κ+ r
M b2 +
κ (N −X)
M s2
∫ ∆
∆w
[1− F (x)] dx
ηM s2
, (134)
0 = (M s2 )
2 −M s2f (∆w)
[
(N −X)mb2 +Xms2
]
− κXF (∆w) , (135)
M b2 = M
s
2 − f (∆w)
[
(N −X)mb2 +Xms2
]
. (136)
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From the above equation system, we obtain M s2 =
√
TVw
√
1−η
η
c+ĉs
c+ĉb
, M b2 =
√
TVw
√
η
1−η
c+ĉb
c+ĉs
, and
ms2 =
[√
1− η
η
√
TVw
Nf (∆w)
+
(
1− X
N
)
(κ+ r) ĉb√
η (1− η)TVw
]√
c+ ĉs
c+ ĉb
−
[√
η
1− η
√
TVw
Nf (∆w)
+
(κ+ r)
(
1− XN
)
c√
η (1− η)TVw
]√
c+ ĉb
c+ ĉs
, (137)
mb2 =
[√
1− η
η
√
TVw
Nf (∆w)
− X
N
(κ+ r) ĉb√
η (1− η)TVw
]√
c+ ĉs
c+ ĉb
+
[
X
N
(κ+ r) c√
η (1− η)TVw
−
√
η
1− η
√
TVw
Nf (∆w)
]√
c+ ĉb
c+ ĉs
. (138)
As a final step, we verify that under the condition c > ĉ, we have ∆b > ∆s.
8.3 Proof of Proposition 21
Equations (20) and (21) show that ∆b and ∆s are determined independently. Therefore, if there is
a perturbation to one, the other does not respond. Hence, the equilibrium in Theorem 1 is stable.
Suppose there is a perturbation to asset owners’ choice, i.e.,
∆s(1) = ∆s + s, (139)
where s is a sufficiently small quantity. We use b to denote non-owners’ best response to asset
owners’ decision rule (139). That is, the cutoff point for non-owners’ decision rule ∆b(1) is
∆b(1) = ∆b + b.
Following the logic for (45), we can determine the response b from the indifference condition:
c
λη
=
∆b(1)−∆s(1)
κ+ r
Ns(1) +
κX
κ+ λNb (1)
∫ ∆s(1)
0 F (y) dy
κ+ r + λ (1− η)Nb (1) ,
where Nb (1) and Ns (1) can be derived from (108) and (109) by replacing ∆b and ∆s by ∆b(1) and
∆s(1). For the almost-Walrasian equilibrium in Proposition 20, the above equation implies
∂b
∂s
=
(1−η)Mb2
κ+r − Xf(∆w)Ms2+Mb2
(
2ĉb +
c2−ĉbĉs
c+ĉs
)
(1−η)Mb2
κ+r +
(N−X)f(∆w)
Ms2+M
b
2
(
2ĉb +
c2−ĉbĉs
c+ĉs
) .
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Similarly, we can compute asset owners’ response s to non-owners’ perturbation b, and obtain
∂s
∂b
=
c+ĉs
c+ĉb
(1−η)Mb2
κ+r − (N−X)f(∆w)Ms2+Mb2
(
2ĉs +
c2−ĉbĉs
c+ĉb
)
c+ĉs
c+ĉb
(1−η)Mb2
κ+r +
Xf(∆w)
Ms2+M
b
2
(
2ĉs +
c2−ĉbĉs
c+ĉb
) .
Therefore, we obtain ∣∣∣∣∂b∂s ∂s∂b
∣∣∣∣ < 1.
That is, an initial perturbation will die out and ∆b(n) and ∆s(n) converge to ∆b and ∆s, respec-
tively, when the number of iterations goes to infinity. Therefore, the almost-Walrasian equilibrium
is stable. Similarly, for the almost-no-trade equilibrium in Propositions 18 and 20, we obtain∣∣∣∣∂b∂s ∂s∂b
∣∣∣∣ = (κ+M s1 )
(
κ+M b1
)
M s1M
b
1
> 1.
Therefore, this equilibrium is unstable.
57
References
Adrian, Tobias and Hyun Song Shin, 2010, The Changing Nature of Financial Intermediation and
the Financial Crisis of 2007-09, Annual Review of Economics 2, 603–618.
Afonso, Gara and Ricardo Lagos, 2014, An Empirical Study of Trade Dynamics in the Fed Funds
Market, working paper.
Afonso, Gara and Ricardo Lagos, 2015, Trade Dynamics in the Market for Federal Funds, Econo-
metrica, forthcoming.
Atkeson, Andrew, Andrea Eisfeldt, and Pierre-Olivier Weill, 2014, Entry and Exit in OTC Deriva-
tives Markets, working paper.
Babus, Ana and Peter Kondor, 2012, Trading and information diffusion in OTC markets, working
paper.
Bao, Jack, Jun Pan, and Jiang Wang, 2011, The Illiquidity of Corporate Bonds, Journal of Finance
66, 911–946.
Chang, Briana, 2014, Adverse Selection and Liquidity Distortion, working paper.
Chang, Briana and Shengxing Zhang, 2015, Endogenous Market Making and Network Formation,
working paper.
Di Maggio, Marco, Amir Kermani, and Zhaogang Song, 2015, The Value of Trading Relationship
in Turbulent Times.
Duffie, Darrell, Nicolae Garleanu, and Lasse Pedersen, 2002, Securities Lending, Shorting and
Pricing, Journal of Financial Economics, 66, 307–339.
Duffie, Darrell, Nicolae Garleanu, and Lasse Pedersen, 2005, Over-the-Counter Markets, Econo-
metrica, 73, 1815–1847.
Duffie, Darrell, Nicolae Garleanu, and Lasse Pedersen, 2007, Valuation in Over-the-Counter Mar-
kets, Review of Financial Studies, 66, 307–339.
Duffie, Darrell, Piotr Dworczak, and Haoxiang Zhu, 2014, Benchmarks in Search Markets, working
paper.
Feldhutter, Peter, 2012, The same bond at different prices: Identifying search frictions and selling
pressures, Review of Financial Studies 25, 1155–1206.
Gale, Douglas, 1987, Limit Theorems for Markets with Sequential Bargaining, Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory 43, 20–54.
Garleanu, Nicolae, 2009, Portfolio choice and pricing in illiquid markets, Journal of Economic
Theory, 144, 532–564.
Gavazza, Alessandro, 2011, Leasing and secondary markets: Theory and evidence from commercial
aircraft, Journal of Political Economy, 119, 325–377.
Glode, Vincent and Christian Opp, 2014, Adverse Selection and Intermediation Chains, working
paper.
58
Gofman, Michael, 2010, A network-based analysis of over-the-counter markets, working paper.
Green, Richard, Burton Hollifield, and Norman Schurhoff, 2007, Financial Intermediation and the
Costs of Trading in an Opaque Market, Review of Financial Studies 20, 275–314.
He, Zhiguo, and Konstantin Milbradt, 2013, Endogenous Liquidity and Defaultable Debt, Econo-
metrica, forthcoming.
Hosios, Arthur, 1990, On the Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unem-
ployment, Review of Economic Studies 57, 279–298.
Hugonnier, Julien, Benjamin Lester, and Pierre-Olivier Weill, 2016, Heterogeneity in Decentralized
Asset Markets, working paper.
Jankowitsch, Rainer, Amrut Nashikkar, and Marti Subrahmanyam, 2011, Price dispersion in OTC
markets: A new measure of liquidity, Journal of Banking and Finance 35, 343–357.
Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro and Randall Wright, 1993, A search-theoretic approach to monetary eco-
nomics, American Economic Review, 83, 63–77.
Lagos, Ricardo, 2010, Asset Prices and Liquidity in an Exchange Economy, Journal of Monetary
Economy, 57, 913–930.
Lagos Ricardo, and Guillaume Rocheteau, 2009, Liquidity in Asset Markets with Search Frictions,
Econometrica, 77, 403–426.
Lagos, Ricardo, Guillaume Rocheteau, and Pierre-Olivier Weill, 2011, Crises and Liquidity in
OTC markets, Journal of Economic Theory, 146, 2169–2205.
Lagos, Ricardo and Randall Wright, 2005, A unified framework for monetary theory and policy
analysis, Journal of political Economy, 113, 463–484.
Lagos, Ricardo, and Shengxing Zhang, 2014, Monetary Exchange in Over-the-Counter Markets:
A Theory of Speculative Bubbles, the Fed Model, and Self-fulfilling Liquidity Crises, working
paper.
Lester, Benjamin, Andrew Postlewaite, and Randall Wright, 2012, Information, liquidity, asset
prices, and monetary policy, Review of Economic Studies, 79, 1209–1238.
Lester, Benjamin, Guillaume Rocheteau, and Pierre-Olivier Weill, 2014, Competing for order flow
in OTC markets, working paper.
Li, Dan and Norman Schurhoff, 2012, Dealer networks, working paper.
Li, Yiting, Guillaume Rocheteau, and Pierre-Olivier Weill, 2012, Liquidity and the threat of
fraudulent assets, Journal of Political Economy, 120, 815–846.
Malamud, Semyon and Marzena Rostek, 2012, Decentralized exchange, working paper.
Neklyudov, Artem, 2014, Bid-Ask Spreads and the Over-the-Counter Interdealer Markets: Core
and Peripheral Dealers, working paper.
Nosal, Ed, Yuet-Yee Wong, and Randall Wright, 2015, More on Middlemen: Equilibrium Entry
and Efficiency in Intermediated Markets, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, forthcoming.
Pagnotta, Emiliano and Thomas Philippon, 2013, Competing on speed, working paper.
59
Roll, Richard, 1984, A simple implicit measure of the effective bid-ask spread in an efficient market,
Journal of Finance 39, 1127–1139.
Rubinstein, Ariel and Asher Wolinsky, 1985, Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining,
Econometrica 53, 1133–1150.
Shen, Ji, and Hongjun Yan, 2014, A Search Model of Aggregate Demand for Liquidity and Safety,
working paper.
Taylor, John, 2001, Expectations, Open Market Operations, and Changes in the Federal Funds
Rate, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, 83, 33–47.
Trejos, Alberto and Randall Wright, 2014, Search-based models of money and finance: An inte-
grated approach, Journal of Economic Theory, forthcoming.
Vayanos, Dimitri, and Tan Wang, 2007, Search and Endogenous Concentration of Liquidity in
Asset Markets, Journal of Economic Theory, 66, 307–339.
Vayanos, Dimitri, and Pierre-Olivier Weill, 2008, A Search-Based Theory of the On-the-run Phe-
nomenon, Journal of Finance, 63, 1361–1398.
Vayanos, Dimitri, and Jean-Luc Vila, 2009, A Preferred-Habitat Model of the Term-Structure of
Interest Rates, working paper.
Viswanathan, S. and James Wang, 2004, Inter-Dealer Trading in Financial Markets, Journal of
Business, 77, 987–1040.
Weill, Pierre-Olivier, 2007, Leaning Against the Wind, Review of Economic Studies, 74, 1329–
1354.
Weill, Pierre-Olivier, 2008, Liquidity Premia in Dynamic Bargaining Markets, Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory, 140, 66–96.
Wright, Randall and Yuet-Yee Wong, 2014, Buyers, Sellers and Middlemen: Variations on Search-
Theoretic Themes, International Economic Review 55, 375–397.
Zhu, Haoxiang, 2012, Finding a Good Price in Opaque Over-the-Counter Markets, Review of
Financial Studies, 25 1255–1285.
60
Table 1: Model Predictions
This table summarizes the model predictions. The first column are the variables that we will
measure empirically. The second column reports the variables in our model, for which the variable
in the first column is a proxy. The third column reports the predicted relation with the length
of the intermediation chain L and the price dispersion ratio DR. L is the ratio of the volume of
transactions generated by dealers to that generated by customers, and is defined in (26). DR is
the price dispersion among inter-dealer trades divided by the price dispersion among all trades,
and is defined in (31). Size is the initial face value of the issuance size of the corporate bond,
denominated in million dollars. Age is the time since the issuance, denominated in years. Turnover
is the total trading volume of a bond in face value during the period, normalized by Size. IG is
a dummy variable, which is 1 if the bond is rated as investment grade, and 0 otherwise. Maturity
is the the time until maturity of a bond, measured in years. Spread of a bond is the square root
of the negative of the first-order autocovariance of changes in consecutive transaction prices of the
bond.
Variable Proxy for Relation with L and DR
Size X −
Age X +
Turnover κ +
IG c +
Maturity c −
Spread c +
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
This table reports the summary statistics of the variables defined in Table 1, all of which are mea-
sured at the monthly frequency. For each variable, the table reports its mean, standard deviation,
the 99th, 75th, 50th, 25th, and 1st percentiles, as well as the number of observations.
Mean S.D. 99% 75% 50% 25% 1% Obs.
L All 1.73 0.96 7.00 2.10 1.36 1.02 1.00 862109
IG 1.81 0.97 7.53 2.25 1.48 1.05 1.00 526272
DR All 0.50 0.31 1.00 0.76 0.54 0.25 0.00 683379
IG 0.51 0.31 1.00 0.75 0.54 0.27 0.00 436993
Turnover All 0.08 0.12 1.02 0.10 0.04 0.01 0.00 866831
(per month) IG 0.07 0.11 0.76 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.00 528698
Spread All 1.43 1.46 14.88 1.81 1.02 0.56 0.05 590883
(%) IG 1.32 1.24 6.77 1.69 0.97 0.54 0.04 372473
Size All 462 1645 3000 500 275 150 2.00 866832
($million) IG 537 2029 3000 600 300 175 3.11 528698
Age All 4.86 4.50 18.91 6.91 3.73 1.64 0.02 866832
(year) IG 5.06 4.56 18.89 7.32 3.91 1.71 0.04 528698
Maturity All 8.19 9.35 33.37 9.57 5.08 2.37 0.08 866523
(year) IG 8.67 9.91 35.17 10.08 5.00 2.25 0.08 528434
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Table 3: Regression Results
This table reports the estimated coefficients from Fama-MacBeth regressions of intermediation
chain length L and price dispersion ratio DR on a number of independent variables, at monthly and
quarterly frequencies. All variables are defined in Table 1. T -statistics are reported in parentheses.
The superscripts ∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
L DR
Monthly Quarterly Monthly Quarterly
IG 0.245∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.004
(32.17) (20.43) (2.62) (1.14)
Turnover 0.199∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗
(11.48) (10.47) (26.58) (15.59)
Size(×10−3) −0.012∗∗∗ −0.008∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗
(3.73) (1.66) (15.17) (8.88)
Age 0.025∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(23.92) (13.92) (5.39) (5.47)
Maturity −0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.001∗∗∗ 0.000
(3.72) (0.08) (6.00) (0.40)
Spread 0.073∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗
(17.17) (8.22) (4.47) (2.54)
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Figure 1: The evolution of demographics.
Panel A: Non-intermediation equilibrium: ∆b ≥ ∆s
Panel B: Intermediation equilibrium: ∆b < ∆s
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